Monday, November 23, 2009

Martin Armstrong is once again making waves - February 4, 2009

February 4, 2009

Martin Armstrong’s Latest… from behind bars.

Martin Armstrong is once again making waves and becoming a topic of conversation from behind bars. There is much written about his circumstance and his past research. If you are not familiar with his work then it will be worth your time to at least become familiar with his wave theory. Here is a link to his basic Economic Confidence Model The Business Cycle And the Future . Here's a link to the article describing why he is in jail for contempt of court: The New York Times, and here's the article describing his additional 5 year term: The Wall Street Journal. I am NOT defending him, nor do I know or will I speculate on his activities that put him behind bars, I am mearly providing links to the information so that you can decide for yourself.

Here is a link to his article in .pdf form that he typed while in prison last year. In it he rants and raves a little but he provides some very valuable insights into wave theory, he is way ahead of many others in his understanding, I believe. Is it actionable? Not in the short term, but in the long term I believe his understanding is way better than most. This is a long read, but makes a good skim: It’s Just Time. The article below is a good summary of his pertinent thoughts but does not go very deeply into his wave theory.

Most people would consider him to be a little on the "flaky" side. I however do not in any way place him in the "tinfoil" category. He is a creative and outside the box thinker - that does not mean that he is not correct. And, in fact, he has been much more correct than most of the people who ordinary citizens would label "professional." Now, his timing may not be perfect and he may be a lousy trader and record keeper, but his insights into wave theory should not be ignored. Neither should his insights into the fundamentals of debt or the mechanics of the markets. This is a far better and more accurate article than 95% of the B.S. that comes across my screen.

Nate


Martin Armstrong: The Coming Great Depression

Armstrong Economics

The Coming Great Depression

Why Government Is Powerless


It is frustrating to read so many comparisons of our current situation with 1929 while watching policy be set-in-motion to create spending on infrastructure. Everyone has their hand out looking for a bailout like a bunch of street burns pleading for money so they can get drunk or stay drunk. Almost nothing of what I have read is close to being accurate. The scary part is depressions are inevitably caused by politicians who may be paving the road with good intentions, but are relying upon analysis so biased, we do not stand a chance.

The stock market by no means predicts the economy. A stock market crash does not cause a Depression. The Crash of 1903 was properly titled – “The Rich Man's Panic." What has always distinguished a recession from a Depression is the stock market drop may signal a recession, but the collapse in debt signals a Depression. This Depression was set in motion by (1) excessive leverage by the banks once more, but (2) the lifting of usury laws back in 1980 to fight inflation that opened the door to the highest consumer interest rates in thousands of years and shifted spending that created jobs into the banks as interest on things like credit cards. As a percent of GDP, household debt doubled since 1980 making the banks rich and now the clear and present danger to our economic survival. A greater proportion of spending by the consumer that use to go to savings and creating jobs, goes to interest and that has undermined the ability to avoid a major economic melt-down.

The crisis in banking has distinguished depression from recession. The very term "Black Friday" comes from the Panic of 1869 when the mob was dragging bankers out of their offices and hanging them in New York. They had to send in troops to stop the riot. A banking collapse destroys the capital formation of a nation and that is what creates the Depression. The stock market is not the problem despite the fact it is visible and measurable and may decline 40%, 60% or even 89% like in 1929-32. But the stock market decline is normally measured in months (30-37) whereas the economic decline is measured in years (23-26). Beware of schizophrenic analysis that is often mutually contradictory or often antagonistic in part or in quality for far too often people think they have to offer a reason for every daily movement.

Our fate will not be determined by the stock market performance. Neither can we stimulate the economy by increasing spending on infrastructure any more than buying your wife a mink coat, will improve the grades of your child in school. We are facing a Depression that will last 23-26 years. The response of government is going to seal our fate because they cannot learn from the past and will make the same mistakes that every politician has made before them. Even if the Dow Industrials make new highs next week (impossible), the Depression is unstoppable with current models and tools.

Stocks & Consumers vs. Investment Banks
Let us set the record straight. The Stock Market is a mere reflection of the economy like looking at yourself in a mirror. It is not the economy and does not even provide a reliable forecasting tool of what is to come economically. We are headed into the debt tsunami that is of historical proportions unheard-of in history. There have been the big debt crisis incidents that have hobbled nations, toppled kings, and set in motion economic dark ages. It is so critical to understand the difference between the economy and the stock market, for unless you comprehend this basic and root distinction between the two, survival may be impossible.


To the left I have provided the Economic Confidence Model for the immediate decline. You will notice I did not call this the "stock market model" nor a model for gold, oil, or commodities. I used the word "economic" with distinct and clear purpose. I have stressed it does not forecast the fate, of a particular market or even a particular economy. It is the global economic cycle some may call even a business cycle. Please note that what does line-up and peaks precisely with this model often even to the specific day that was calculated decades advance is the area of primary focus. Yet the US stock market reached a high precisely with this model and then rallied to a new high price 8.6 months later. In Japan, the NIKKEI 225 peaked precisely on February 26th, 2007. This is not a very good omen. But there was something profound that turned down with the February 27th, 2007 target - the S&P Case-Shiller index of housing prices in 20 cities. February 2007 was the peak for this cycle in the debt markets - not the US stock market. [edit by Nate - this was also the date that New Century Financial, a sub-prime lender, failed. I wrote in my own newsletter on that day that it marked the beginning of the end of the credit bubble].

The stock market always bottoms in advance of the economic low. In fact, we will see new highs in the now even in the middle of a Great Depression. At least the 1929 cycle was more of a bubble top in stocks than what we have in place currently in the US stock market. We still had the bubble top in the NASDAQ back in 2000, but this illustrates the point. There was a major explosive speculative boom. The bubble burst in 2000 and there was a moderate investment recession into 2002, but there was no appreciable economic decline that was set in motion because of that crash. Currently, we have a major high in 2007, but it was not a bubble top because it was not the focus of speculation. The real concentration of capital that created the bubble top, took place in the debt markets. This is the origin of the economic depression - not stocks and not the displacement of farmers because of a 7 year drought created by the Dust Bowl that invoked the response of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935. Keep in mind the stock market bottomed in the mid summer of 1932 when unemployment was not excessive from a historical perspective. The 25% level of unemployment came after the major 1932 stock market low that was followed by both the banking crisis after the election of FDR and before his fateful inauguration. The Banking Crisis came about because of rumors that Roosevelt was going to confiscate gold. Herbert Hoover published his memoirs showing letters written to Roosevelt pleading with him to make a statement that the rumors were false. He did not.

It’s the Debt Level Stupid
In 1907, the excessive debt was in the stock market. Call Money Rates (the level of interest paid to support broker loans) reached 125%. Even 1929 never came close to such levels. This also illustrates that the capital markets do not have enough money to invest equally on all levels in all segments of a domestic economy or in particular nations. To create the boom-bust, it requires the concentration of capital. A bubble top is formed when the majority of those seeking to employ money to make money are focused in a particular market or even country. The 1907 Crash was a bubble top because capital invested on a highly concentrated basis in railroad stocks. The bubble top in Japan back in 1989 was caused by a concentration of both domestic and international capital that had made Japan the number one market in the World. It is this concentration of capital that creates the boom and bust cycle. If money was evenly disbursed like the socialistic & communistic philosophies argue, we would be back to the dark ages where there was no concentration of capital and no economy beyond the walls of the castle so to speak. That is why communism failed.

It is the overall level of debt that has reached a bubble top in almost every possible area. For example, in 1980, household debt was about 50% of GDP. Going into the February 2007 high, it reached about 100% of GDP. We must also realize that something profound took place back in 1980. Americans would on the first blush seem to be living it up, buying everything they can on credit and have piles of tangible assets to show for it. That is like looking at the statistics for carrots and arguing that they are lethal because every person who has ever eaten a carrot is dead or in the process of a gradual slow death. This absurd example illustrates the bias that can produce the schizophrenic analysis.

There were, once upon a time, usury laws that generally held any interest rate greater than 10% was illegal. The Federal Reserve under Paul Volker believed that interest rates needed to be raised to insane levels to stop the runaway inflation, which was the first stone that hit the water sending the shock waves that we are having to pay for today. Once the usury laws were altered so the Fed could fight inflation, it set in motion the doubling of household debt, not to mention the national debt. At 8%, the principle is doubled through interest in less than 10 years. The national debt exploded from $1 to about $10 trillion in 25 years and household debt has doubled. Some states now consider usury to be 26%. Historically, these are the interest rates paid by the very worst of all debtors - the bankrupts. In fact, in China, the worst creditors historically paid at best 10%. What we have done is the lifting of usury to fight inflation back in 1980, has resulted in usury now being so high, a larger portion of income of the common worker is spent on interest, not buying goods & services that even create jobs. This is one primary reason why jobs have been leaving as well. The consumer needs the lowest possible price and labor wants the highest wages, and to stay competitive, producers leave taking manufacturing jobs as well as service jobs. The extraordinary rise in interest rates that are historical highs since at least pre-Roman times, could not have been possible but for the lifting of usury laws back in 1980 to fight inflation. This amounted to setting a fire to try to stop a brush fire that failed. Consumers pay the highest rates in thousands of years that feed the banks at the expense of economic growth. Even the National Debt rose from $2. 1 to $8.5 trillion between 1 986 and 2006 with $6. 1 trillion being interest. We are funding the nation on a credit card and destroying the economy simultaneously.

This has been enhanced by the tremendous leverage and false position that were created in the derivative markets causing the banks to just implode. Indeed, this is the origin of the economic Depression we are facing. The $700 billion bailout might have worked if Paulson did what he said he would - buy the debt and take it out of the banks. Had the debt been segregated into a pool and managed independently by a hedge fund manager not an investment banker, we could have mitigated the problem. But that is now too late.

The credit implosion is taking place on a wholesale basis around the world. The more the economy declines in housing prices, the greater the defaults, the greater the foreclosures, and the lower the economy will move. We are now in a downward spiral that cannot be fixed by indirect schemes. As I said, you cannot get your kid's test scores up by purchasing a mink coat for your wife. Everyone will have their hand out begging for infrastructure money. But the theory of just spending money that will somehow make things better, it is like handing Mexico a trillion dollars and arguing that they will buy US goods that will somehow reverse the economy.

The leveraging of debt by the Investment Banks in particular has undermined the global economy. Where household debt has doubled since 1980, the professional financial service sector has seen a rise from 21% of GDP in 1980 to 116% by February 2007. Now consider the debt that they created with the mortgages is already down by 50% and falling, the bailouts will keep coming. To help correct the problem, the commercial banks will tighten credit to make their exposure less, and in fact, their solvency ratios will require it anyway. This we can expect to see not just in business, but housing and car loans that will contract the economy as well.

The Great Depression is not the perfect model for today. It was a complete capital contraction. The stock market basis the now Dow Jones Industrials fell 89% between September 3rd, 1929 and July 1932. The contraction in debt was quite massive. Then too, the leverage in banks collapsed that reduces the velocity of money and therefore the money supply. The banks were the first real widespread failures with 608 in 1930. Between February and August 1931, the commercial banks began to bleed profusely as bank deposits fell almost $3 billion or about 9% of all deposits. As 1932 began, the number of bank failures reached 1,860. The massive amount of bank failures in the thousands took place with the rumor of Roosevelt's intention to confiscate gold. Although he denied that was his policy the night of the elections, he remained silent refusing to discuss the issue until he was sworn in. on March 6, 1933 just 2 days after taking office, Roosevelt called a bank "holiday" closing the banks from which at least another 2,500 never reopened.

All of these events are contrasted by the collapse in national debts in Europe. Other than Herbert Hoover’s memoirs, I have yet to read any analysis of the Great Depression attribute anything internationally other than the infamous US Smoot-Hawley Act setting in motion the age of protectionism in June 1930. It was the financial war between European nations attacking each other's bond markets openly shorting them that led to all of Europe defaulting on their debt. Even Britain went into a moratorium suspending debt payments. This is what put the pressure on capital flows sending waves of capital to the United States that to sane degree was kind of like the capital flow to Japan into 1989. This put tremendous pressure upon the dollar driving it to new record highs that were misread by the politicians who did not understand capital flow. They responded with Smoot-Hawley misreading the entire set of facts. (see Greatest Bull Market In History) (Herbert Hoover's memoirs).

It is true that today we have Keynesian and Monetarist theories to manage the crisis. Sad to say, neither one will now work. Bernanke has responded in force dropping the federal funds rate from 5.25% to .25%. He has also opened the Fed Window and thrown out more than $1 trillion in 13 months. However, as admirable as this may be, he has no tool that will do the job. Milton Friedman was correct! The Great Depression was not caused by the decline in the stock market. The event was set in motion by the credit and banking crisis that resulted in a one-third contraction in the money supply.

Interest rates will do nothing. The flight to quality always takes place so what happens is a two-fold punch. (1) Interest rates collapse because capital seeks preservation not yield and will accept during such times virtually a zero rate of return, and (2) the flight to quality takes more available cash from the private sector because government debt truly does compete with the private sector. We are seeing this even now. Federal debt becomes the place to go so we see higher yields in both state am municipal bonds because they are not quality and could default like any bank. This contracts the money supply. Opening the window and just throwing buckets of money into the system will never have any impact to reverse the trend.

Furthermore, we are now in a Floating-Exchange Rate system that has made the global economy far more complex than it was in 1929. We all know that China is one of the biggest holders of US government debt. With the contagion spreading to Russia, South America, and China aside from Europe, we see a steeper decline in the China stock market than we do in the United States because that is where capital had concentrated domestically. If China needs money to stimulate its own economy when exports appear to be collapsing by about 50%, then we can see that the Keynesian model is worthless. If the Fed tries to pump money into the system through buying bonds from the private sector, those bonds may be held by aliens who take the money back to their own economies. The Fed cannot be sure it is even capable of stimulating the purely domestic economy. Lower interest rates to virtually zero like Japan did during the 19905, then if capital finds a better place to invest, it can leave for a higher rate of interest as capital did from Japan to the United states, which is why their domestic economy was never stimulated by the' lower interest rates.

Leverage during the Great Depression was not even remotely close to what we have to face today. The credit-default swaps are alone worth about $60 trillion. This was a stupid product for it has so tangled the world there may be no way out. This product created the false illusion that you did not have to worry about the quality of the loan because it was insured. We have no way of covering this level of implosion. Add the unfunded entitlements and then the state and local debts who cannot print money to cover their shortfall s, and we are looking at a contraction of debt that is simply beyond all contemplation.

So What Now?
So now that we see it is not Wall Street, again, but the banks, perhaps we can separate the facts from the fantasy. We can now see that there are two separate and distinct forecasts to be made - (1) economy and (2) stock market. Economic Depressions have a duration unfortunately of generally 23 years with an outside potential of 26 years. The 1873 Panic led to a economic depression of really 23 years into 1896. There were bouts with high volatility and injection of major waves of inflation following the major silver discoveries. It was the age of the Silver Democrats who tried to create inflation by over-valuing silver relative to gold. This created a wave of European-American arbitrage where silver flowed into the US exchanging it for gold, which then flowed back to Europe. By 1896, the US Treasury was broke.

The Panic of 1873 marked the collapse of J. Cook & Co, the huge investment bank that was the 19th Century version of Goldman Sachs. They went bust because of excessive leverage in railroad stocks. It matters not what the instrument may be, it is always the leverage, which set the tone for a economic depression that lasted into 1896 where JP Morgan became famous for leading a bailout of the us Treasury organizing a loan of gold bullion. The stock market rallied and made new highs with plenty of panics between 1873 and 1896. The point is, The Panic of 1893 was quite a horrible one. The point is, the stock market is not a reflection of the economy. It often trades up in anticipation of better times, and trades down on those same perceptions of bad times. In both cases, new highs or lows unfold even contrary to economic trends.

We will see new highs in the now long before we see the final low in the economy. The ideal lows on a timing basis for the stock market will be as soon as April 2009 or by June of 2009. The more pronounced lows would be due on a timing basis between December 2009 and April 2010. The most extreme target would seem to be August 2010. The shorter the resolution to the stock market low, the sooner we will start to see much higher volatility.

The low for the Dow would be indicated by reaching the 3,500-4,000 area. A 2008 closing below 12,000 in the cash now Jones Industrials will signal that the bear market is underway into at least 2009 if not 2010. A year-end closing for 2008 below the 9,700-9,800 level, will signal higher volatility as well. The real critical level for the closing of 2008 will be the 7,200 area generally. A year-end closing beneath this general level will signal that we could see the sharp decline to test the extremes support at 3,600-4,000 by as early as April 19th, 2009 going into May /June 2009. If we were to drop so quickly into those targets, this would be most likely the major low with a significant rally into at least April 16th, 2010.

The less volatile outcome would be a prolonged decline into the December 2009 target to about April 16th, 2010. A low at that late date would tend to project out for a high as early as June 2011 or into late 2012. Nevertheless, volatility appears to be very high. Those who were at the 1985 Economic conference in Princeton, may want to review those video tapes. The volatility we were looking at 20-30 years into the future is now. As 3 of the 5 major investment bankers failed, Merrill, Lehman and Bear, the liquidity has evaporated so the swings are going to be much more dramatic.

The major support is 3,600 on the now Industrials. During '09, the support area appears to be 6,600, 5,000, and 4,000-3,600. Clearly, resistance is shaping up at 9,700-9,800. It would take a monthly close back above the 12,400 level to signal new highs are likely. If we saw a complete collapse into a low by April 2009 or June 2009 reaching the 4,000 general area, this would be the major low with most likely a hyper-inflationary spiral developing thereafter. In that case, the now Jones Industrials could be back at even new highs as early as mid 2011 or going into late 2012.

Gold has decoupled from oil as it should and has been rising on an ounce-to-barrel ratio. Here, the pivot area for 2009 seems to be the $730-$760 area with the key support being still at the $525-$540 zone. The major high intraday was on March 17th, 2008. A weekly closing below $800 warns of consolidation. Only a monthly closing below the $535 area would signal a major high is in place. The more critical support appears to be at about $680 - $705. A weekly closing beneath this area will also warn of a potential consolidation. A major high is possible as early as 2010-2011 with the potential for an exponential rally into 2015 if there is any kind of a low going into 2011.45. The key to watch will be crude Oil. The collapse of Investment Banks has removed the speculation that exaggerated the trend. A year-end close below $40 for 2008 would signal a major high and serious economic decline ahead.

There Are No Tools Left! The Emperor Has No Clothes
It is hard to explain to someone who believe he has power, that he really has nothing of any significance. This becomes the story of the Emperor Has No Clothes. No one will tell him, and if you do, it may be off-with-your-head. This is akin to the man behind the curtain in the Wizard of OZ trying to keep up the whole illusion. After all, why do we vote for people unless we believe that will somehow change our lives?

Interest Rates
When an economy is rising and the stock market is exploding, interest rates always rise because the demand for money is rising because people believe that they can make a profit. Government pretend to be raising interest rates to stop inflation, but they do not create a trend contrary to the free markets. What happened in 1980 was merely that the government over-shoots the differential between expectations and the rate of interest. If you believe the stock market will double, you will pay 20% interest. A rising interest rate does not create a bear market. Only when the rate of interest exceeds expectations of potential profit offering almost a fixed secured return, will capital leave the speculative market and run to the bond market.

In a bear market, interest rates always decline because of the flight to quality. When there is a risk of a .banking crisis as well, then the flight to quality shows that capital is willing to accept virtually zero in return for the privilege to park itself is a secure manner to preserve the future.

In both cases, the government may accelerate the trend, but by no means can they create the trend or alter the trend. Lowering interest rates to zero right now will not reverse the economic decline. People will look out the window and until they feel confident again, they will not come out from behind the castle walls. Japan lowered interest rates to virtually zero for nearly a decade. All it did was fuel the carry trade whereby yen was borrowed at 0.1 % and invested in dollars at 5-8%. There was little opportunity to invest domestically in Japan and the stock market languished in a broad consolidation with flurries the upside every-now-and-again.

Monetary Theory
The Fed has already put into the system about $1 trillion in 13 months. The real problem is they are buying back US government debt injecting cash into the system. But if those bonds are sold to the Fed by foreign holders, there can be no injection of cash into the domestic economy. This amounts to the monetization of our debt in any event. Clearly, buying bonds from the market is not a guaranteed increase in domestic money supply especially when the velocity of money is itself collapsing. Borrowing heavily all these years and depending on foreign investors to buy that debt, altered the course of economics. Of course there has always been the foreign investor, but there has not been the floating exchange rate system. The rise and fall of the dollar itself can now either attract foreign capital with an advance or repel capital with its decline. Like we needed another new variable.

Infrastructure Spending
There really is nothing left in the tool bag that can help even to mitigate the coming Economic Depression. The unemployment rate at the end of 1930 was only about 8.9% - similar to the 1975 recession. Things were very slow back then. Even housing was not moving and people took whatever offers came their way. It was the Dust Bowl that began in 1934 that sent the unemployment rising after the 1932 low in the stock market. About 40% of the work force was agrarian. Hence, Congress could not pass a law to make it rain. The real devastation was that this presented a huge portion of the work force that had to be retrained into skilled labor. It was the Great Depression that finally by force of necessity, created an industrial work force that may have taken another 200 years to unfold by gradual transformation.

The WPA was formed in 1935, 3 years after the low in the stock market (1932). It had a slow and marginal success. At best, if we attribute all improvement to this one program, very unlikely, unemployment was only reduced by about 20%.

1935 20.3%

1936 16.9%

1937 14.3%

1938 19.0%

1939 17.2%

1940 14.6%

Even if we attribute everything to the WPA, all the way into 1940, the most the unemployment declines was by 30%. However, at the end of World War II, we see an Unemployment rate of 1.9% by 1945. Any ideas that we can spend trillions on infrastructure and make it all better, forget it.

Turning to infrastructure in the middle of a debt crisis makes no sense. The idea of just spending money will somehow stimulate the economy, will not work. This is like trying to fight in the desert of Iraq using the same tactics as in Vietnam. There has to be sane connection to what we are doing. Just because FDR instituted the WPA when we had a huge displacement issue in the work force, almost 6 years after the crash began, makes no sense at all for our current problems. As I said, this is like buying your wife a mink coat to somehow influence your kid to get their grades up. The connection is tenuous at best and nonexistent in all reality.

Summary
Unless we attack the debt structure directly, there is no point in counting upon any government to help mitigate the problem and more-likely-than-not, our very future may be recast in so many ways, the level of frustration will rise, and that leads to war because war distracts the people from hanging their own politicians. The oldest trick in the book is to blame the guy next-door down. Unless we are honestly prepared to truly 1) reorganize the structure of government, 2) reorganize the entire debt structure both private and public, 3) regulate leverage, 4) restore usury laws that will free up personal income, and 5) look at just eliminating the federal income tax in combination with 6) establishing a new national heathcare system that will restructure all pension plans public and private, there is not much hope for the future from government. Our definition of money (M1) does not include bonds so we can fool ourselves by issuing $10 trillion in bonds is different than printing the cash. It is still money. Taxes are needed in a gold standard where money cannot be created. Stop competing with the states, control the budget as a percent of GDP, increase the money supply to that degree, and stop the taxing when money is created by leverage and velocity anyway. This will restore jobs and inject huge confidence as in 1964 when the payroll tax was cut permanently. One-offs never work. People save the rebates for a rainy day. We need real honest reform since the states will go broke and seek handouts as well. So, it is time to get real. It is time we restructure the entire system including the banks which always cause the problem. We don't need excessive regulation of things that did not create the problem when the real culprits always escape.

You may send comments directly to Martin Armstrong at ArmstrongEconomics@GMail.com.

Saturday, November 21, 2009

What Really Happened with the AIG Swaps? It's Not What You Think

By now most people who follow Goldman Sachs in the news know that it received $13 billion from the Federal Reserve to liquidate its portfolio of derivatives with AIG. Because the Fed was willing to pay Goldman par value on these derivatives, even though the market valued them at about 48 cents on the dollar, Goldman walked away with no loss whatever from the AIG collapse. This has been described as a great gift for Goldman and all the other banks who dealt with AIG and who were treated the same way. Many others have described this as a colossal rip-off of the taxpayers.

How did this come about? We know a lot more this week about these transactions because of a report that has been issued by Neil Barofsky, the Special Inspector General for the bank bailout programs. The press has described this report as particularly damning of the NY Federal Reserve which negotiated these deals with the banks, and which was led at the time by Timothy Geithner, the current Treasury Secretary. These press reports, however, have mischaracterized what happened and what went wrong. The NY Fed acted properly and entirely as one would expect under the circumstances when they negotiated these contract abrogations. To see what really went wrong, follow along on the details below.

The AIG Transactions

First, a little bit of background on what got AIG into trouble. The insurance giant had a subsidiary in London called AIG Financial Products (AIGFP). This company developed a business that offered customers financial protection on a derivatives contract known as a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). These derivatives packaged together various debt instruments, such as loans, bonds, mortgage-backed securities, even other CDOs, into a single security. When you bought the security, you received a regularly scheduled set of cash flows generated by these debt instruments as interest payments were made. You paid an up-front premium for these cash flows, which usually took place over a three to five year period during the life of the security.

It is interesting to note that the buyer of the security, and for that matter the seller/creator of the security, had no legal interest in the debt instruments. The bonds or loans could be any debt of this nature where public information was known about the interest rate, and whether or not a default had occurred by the debtor. There could be dozens, or even hundreds of different debt instruments bundled into one security.

These CDOs carried a public rating from Moody’s or S&P or Fitch, any of the three big ratings agencies. Also, you could get a daily price on the CDOs from a third party pricing agent located in London. If the price was 100, the security traded at its par value, meaning all payments were highly likely to take place over the life of the security as required by the contract. If the price was 48, on the other hand, it meant the market believed the security was seriously impaired due to defaults occurring on some of the debt instruments in the security.

Big banks loved to create CDOs up until the market crashed in 2007. CDOs were very lucrative. Banks had loan books that gave them a natural portfolio of debt as a start in creating a CDO, but there also was the booming housing market bubble that allowed for the creation of mortgage-backed securities. A huge amount of CDOs were created based on these mortgage instruments. Banks also realized that when they created and sold these securities to earn the profitable premiums involved, they were still on the hook in case any of the debt instruments in a security experienced a default. They wanted to get rid of this risk as much as possible, and pay away a little bit of their lucrative premiums for the privilege.

Here is where AIGFP comes in. AIGFP invented a derivative that acted like an insurance contract. Banks would pay AIGFP a premium, and AIGFP would promise to indemnify the banks in the event they experienced any losses on a specified CDO. The company used a derivative called a Credit Default Swap (CDS, unfortunately easy to confuse with a CDO) to structure this insurance product.

AIGFP was not regulated by any financial oversight agency. It didn’t even have to keep reserves on potential payouts on these CDSs, and even if it did, it has stated that the reserve amount would have been very small because it did not anticipate significant losses on the underlying debt instruments it was insuring. What AIGFP had going for it, and what the banks liked, was that it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of AIG, which carried a Aaa rating in its own name for everything it did. By virtue of this rating, AIG was viewed as one of the highest quality companies in the financial world – almost as safe and sound as a government.

The most common type of CDOs brought to AIGFP were called multi-sector: they had a little bit of everything mixed into them – loans, bonds, mortgage-backed securities on sub-prime mortgages as well as higher-quality instruments like prime mortgages. As long as none of these different types of instruments experienced unusual rates of default, the entire CDO would be traded on the market at a price close to par, and the ratings agencies would have no cause to downgrade the security.

What began to cause AIGFP trouble with its portfolio of credit default swaps backing up about $72 billion of multi-sector CDOs, was not that there were so many defaults on the CDOS that AIGFP had to make large payments under the swaps. The real problem was a series of collateral obligations AIGFP undertook every time it entered into a CDS, and the collateral conditions varied from one swap to the next.

There were three possible triggers for a collateral payment from AIGFP to the banks that bought insurance in the form of CDSs. The first occurred if the underlying CDOs being insured in the swap experienced a drop in price on the market – say from par value to 48 cents. The second occurred if the ratings given by Moody’s or some other agency on the CDOs were downgraded. The third occurred if AIG’s Aaa rating itself was downgraded.

You can now begin to see the sequence of liquidity disasters that befell AIGFP, and soon engulfed its parent AIG, starting in the summer of 2007 and extending until September 16, 2008 when AIG was near death. First, as the market realized that the US sub-prime mortgage business was experiencing very high and unexpected defaults, everyone looked at multi-sector CDOs that carried a significant percentage of these debt instruments in the security. These CDOs began to trade at lower and lower levels in the market as no one was sure just how impaired they would become.

Second, the ratings agencies began to downgrade dozens of CDOs because of the heightened default risk, and the lower prices in the market.

Third, the ratings agencies realized by 2008 that AIG stood behind the CDO market as insurer for the tune of $72 billion. At first, the long term rating of AIG was lowered, and this began a series of collateral calls from AIGFP’s swap customers. Then, by the summer of 2008, the ratings agencies were looking at downgrading AIG’s short term ratings, and doing so by several notches, which brought into question whether AIG could meet all of its obligations under these swaps. This accelerated the demands for collateral on AIG, which was experiencing a very unexpected triple whammy of collateral calls. By September, 2008, AIG had already coughed up an astounding $30 billion in collateral, and was really only half way through what ultimately it would need to satisfy contractual demands for collateral from the market. It simply ran out of resources to raise any more liquidity, and it faced inevitable default under its swap contracts, which would have led to bankruptcy.

This was the situation facing the Fed by the second week of September, 2008.

The Fed Steps In

The Fed already had its hands full in the summer and fall of 2008. First, Bear Stearns collapsed and was thrown into the arms of JP Morgan Chase, but only after the Fed agreed to take over the Bear Stearns real estate portfolio worth $30 billion in dodgy real estate assets. The quasi-government giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had to be taken over by the government, then Countrywide Financial collapsed and also was pushed into a forced sale to a bank.

There was so much criticism directed at the government for the way in which these rescues were being done, and the amount of taxpayer money spent in the process, that when it came time to deal with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Treasury and the Fed threw this firm to the wolves on September 15, 2008. It received no help from the government and was thrown into the bankruptcy courts. This precipitated a global market meltdown.

The trigger for this meltdown occurred at the oldest mutual fund in the US, American Reserve Fund, which took a writedown of $785 million on Lehman Bros. bonds it held in its money market fund. This was announced on the afternoon of September 15, and by the close of business that day massive amounts of withdrawals were taking place at American Reserve since no money market fund had ever experienced such a loss (money market funds were supposed to be as safe as checking accounts).

When the market opened the next morning, mutual funds everywhere couldn’t cope with the withdrawals. The commercial paper market ground to a halt, as did the Eurodollar market for short term loans in London. Stock markets around the globe tanked. The global financial system was nearly paralyzed.

The US government stepped in and guaranteed the safety of all money market funds. It allowed Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two surviving old-line investment banks, to become commercial banks and enjoy the benefits of Fed liquidity. The Fed had been working since the previous week on the dire liquidity situation at AIG, and it had asked JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs to form a bank syndicate to provide AIG with a massive $75 billion loan to solve its liquidity problem.

JP Morgan Chase came up with a package that charged AIG an onerous 11.3% on the $75 billion loan – a full $9 billion a year in interest alone. The banks would take an 80% ownership interest in AIG’s assets. This loan package was also intended to stop the ratings agencies from yet again lowering AIG’s ratings, which would have cost the company yet another round of collateral calls from the market.

There was one big problem, though. When the banks looked at AIGFP’s portfolio of swaps, and the potential collateral demands that could still occur, they realized that AIG, if it could sell all of its assets at decent market prices, still wouldn’t be able to meet the liquidity demands. In other words, the way the market was developing, AIG was headed straight towards default and the bankruptcy courts. Making this situation even worse was the global market collapse occurring at the same time as the result of the Lehman bankruptcy. The banks told the Fed that the loan package had collapsed. The banks effectively threw the AIG problem on to the laps of the regulators, none of whom by the way had any legal responsibility, regulatory oversight, or historical familiarity with AIG. It was an insurance company that had somehow become bigger and more important than even the biggest banks.

In deciding what to do, the Fed had about 24 hours from September 15 to 16 to analyze with the Treasury the AIG situation. They discovered that AIG would default on $103 billion in loans from state and local governments, $50 billion in bank loans and derivatives, $20 billion in commercial paper, and $40 billion in insurance covering 401k retirement packages across the US. The problems ranged from the horrendous to the horrific. The municipal bond market stood to be devastated by state and municipal loan losses. The Lehman bankruptcy involved $8 billion in commercial paper losses, which led to the Reserve Primary Fund disaster, but AIG’s commercial paper losses were much bigger at $20 billion. The 401k losses would affect tens of millions of Americans. AIG’s loan losses spread to banks all around the world.

The Fed and Treasury, standing in the middle of a global financial collapse the day after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, felt they had no choice but to save AIG, a much bigger player with far greater reach and implications for economic and financial disaster. The Treasury authorized an $85 billion line of credit at the Federal Reserve NY for the purpose of lending to AIG the amounts needed to post collateral behind its swaps at AIGFP. The Fed had no plan in place on how to do this, so it simply lifted the term sheet conditions from the JP Morgan failed loan package, and used those terms to lend to AIG.

From September 16 through October, the Fed lent $61 billion to AIG, over half of which found its way into the market as collateral to support its swaps. At the same time, AIG was instructed to begin reducing its swap book. This required AIG to turn to all the big banks with which it had a swap portfolio, and ask to close out, or abrogate the swap contracts. The banks would consider doing this, but would not want to be then left with the CDO risk that caused it to enter into the swaps in the first place. There was some talk of AIG therefore taking over the CDOs as well, which had sunk substantially in value because of the default risk, but it was very difficult to agree with each bank on what these CDOs were worth. In fact, the banks weren’t willing to sell these CDOs at any discount whatsoever, despite what the market said they were worth, so AIG turned to the Fed for help, and authorized the Fed to negotiate on their behalf.

Here is where we come to the gist of the Barofsky report and the criticisms of the Fed. But let us recap two critical facts up to this point. As of September 15, AIG was certainly heading for bankruptcy, within a manner of days. The banks stood to lose billions on their swaps with AIG, because they would be under-collateralized if the CDOs fell further in value, and because they could not easily all at once get replacement CDS coverage for their CDOs.

Second, shortly after September 16, the banks began receiving collateral from AIG, courtesy of the Fed via the $85 billion loan authorization. For the next two months, the banks were made whole as necessary whenever their CDOs fell in value. The banks could look at their portfolio with AIGFP and consider it safe and secure because of the collateral, and as important, because of the guaranty of more collateral to come as necessary, courtesy of the federal government.

The Fed Tries Its Hand at Negotiating

In early November the Fed assigned a team of managers to begin negotiating for the abrogation of the CDSs. They chose the eight largest bank counterparties to talk to, including Goldman Sachs, BOA, JP Morgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, UBS, and top of the list was Societe Generale in Paris. The plan was to ask the banks to tear up the CDS contracts through a legal abrogation agreement. It was common for banks to do this in the derivatives market from time to time, though never before on a large scale. The banks always required the customer to pay them for any potential real market losses they may incur in abrogating the contract, plus interest and a bit of a fee for all the trouble. Abrogations have never been cheap, especially if the customer was desperate to get out of a deal.

What would the banks want? Collectively, they held CDOs worth a face value of $62.1 billion, and these were the underlying CDOs behind the swaps bought from AIGFP. The banks wanted to give these over to the Fed and get $62.1 billion back, because otherwise the banks would be stuck with CDOs that were unhedged for further default problems.

The market price for this collective group of CDOs was in early November $29.6 billion, which tells you just how badly the market had trashed these instruments. But the banks held cash collateral of $35.0 billion to protect against just this contingency, and if you add the two numbers up, you come to a bit over the $62.1 billion in face value. In other words, the banks were sitting pretty. They were 100% covered for the existing market losses on these CDOs, and the market pricing was beginning to stabilize.

Remember that all this collateral came from the Fed on behalf of the now moribund AIG. The banks wanted to do a simple deal. They would give the Fed all the CDOs in exchange for $29.6 billion in cash – their current market value. They would keep all the existing cash collateral, so they would be perfectly whole. They would then abrogate the CDSs and have no further claim on AIGFP, as if the whole mess never occurred. The Fed, meaning the taxpayers, would be out $62.1 billion in cash to clean this mess up.

In preparing talking points for the negotiations, the Fed reminded each bank that it would be appropriate to give back some of the collateral to the Fed rather than keep it all. The Fed, by stepping in a month earlier, had saved the banks from billions of losses had AIG gone into bankruptcy, and these losses might have included a systemic crisis in which a few other banks went under and couldn’t pay their obligations as well. “”Be nice to us, given all that we have done for you,” was the Fed motto.

The Fed then tied the hands of their negotiators in several ways. First, the Fed would not threaten to throw AIG into bankruptcy if they didn’t get a “haircut” on the $35 billion in collateral. This would be unethical because the Fed had no plan to put AIG into bankruptcy and everybody knew it. Second, the Fed negotiators would have to do the same haircut deal with everybody. If Goldman Sachs agreed to return 30% of the collateral, JP Morgan Chase would have to agree to the same thing. Third, the banks were told up front that their participation in the negotiations was entirely “voluntary”; nobody was going to be forced to do anything or accept any haircut.

You should not be surprised that seven of the eight banks refused to take any haircut on the collateral and would therefore return none of it. They argued the cash was theirs, not the Fed’s, and they owned it by the sanctity of a legal contract that the Fed was proposing to violate. Second, AIGFP was not in default and there was no bankruptcy, and there wouldn’t be any, so giving back collateral when there was no legal requirement would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty that the banks had to their shareholders. Unstated in all this was the fact that the Fed wasn’t threatening any consequences if the banks refused to give back any of the collateral.

The kicker that destroyed any possibility of the Fed getting some of the collateral back occurred with the French bank. They told the Fed that it was not simply a fiduciary responsibility they had to follow in keeping cash that was rightfully theirs – it was decidedly against French law to give back the collateral because there was no bankruptcy. The French regulators confirmed this in no uncertain terms to the Fed, with the implication that if the Fed pushed on this point relationships with the French government would be damaged. Remember that all the banks had to agree to the same deal, so each bank had a veto power over any deal, and the French bank had the ultimate veto – it was illegal for them to give back the collateral.

The negotiating team reported all this back to Timothy Geithner, and recommended that the Fed settle all the swap abrogations by allowing the banks to keep all the collateral and thereby effectively receive par value on contracts that in the market were worth less than half that. Geithner agreed and the deal was done. The Fed then promptly kept all these details secret, including the names of the banks involved, and even went to court to maintain this secrecy under the financial equivalent of a “state secret” argument. They recently lost this argument on appeal to a higher court, and the Barofsky report severely berated the Fed for this because no terrible consequences have occurred now that the details are known.

What Went Wrong Here?

The Barofsky report lays a pretty heavy blanket of criticism on the Fed for not just the secrecy of their actions, but the actions themselves. The Fed didn’t have to treat everyone all the same. It could have accepted different levels of haircuts. It didn’t have to put so much faith in the sanctity of contracts when AIG was in virtual suspended animation – bankruptcy in all but name.

These criticisms do not show an understanding of how the Fed works. Like any large American organization, it pays considerable attention to the law. Timothy Geithner had a high powered, high-priced General Counsel sitting as his right side all the way. Geithner was told clearly that as long as AIG was not in bankruptcy, the Fed might damage its reputation by violating the terms of perfectly sound legal contracts and insisting on repayment of collateral when it was not legally required. He was also told the Fed had no ethical right to threaten bankruptcy when the threat could not be backed up later in court with proof it was real. He was probably told – though there is no proof of this in the report – that giving any bank preferential treatment on haircuts exposed the Fed later to lawsuits of unfair treatment.

Timothy Geithner is like most American executives – he is a technocrat. He respects technical advice, especially of the legal kind, and he abides by it. Past presidents of the NY Fed might be different – Gerald Corrigan comes to mind during the Drexel Burnham bankruptcy. He would bang some heads together to get an outcome that satisfied the political pressure on the Fed, even if it meant overriding legal advice. Gerald Corrigan, by the way, now works for Goldman Sachs. He might have in this situation taken Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase aside and said, “I want you guys to get your consortium of banks to agree on a haircut – something like 30% would be nice – and I want all of you to come back and voluntarily request that the CDS collateral provisions be waived in favor of paying back to the Fed some amount of the collateral. I don’t care how you do this, and it is not going to be the Fed asking for it – it is going to be voluntarily offered to us.” The banks would not need to be told that there was a steel hand underneath the Fed’s velvet glove.

Maybe Timothy Geithner would have done this, technocrat though he is, if there were enough political pressure on him to save the taxpayers billions of dollars, but there wasn’t. No one in the Bush administration – certainly not Henry Paulson at Treasury – was demanding fairness for the taxpayers. There was public disgust over the whole bailout process, but this disgust got bottled up in a Congress paid for by the financial industry. Barofsky might have mentioned that lack of political pressure, and the consequent insensitivity to taxpayer needs that the Fed and the Treasury displayed, but he didn’t, maybe because his current paymaster, the Obama administration, isn’t showing any such sensitivity either.

Which brings us to the crux of the problem, only hinted at in the Barofsky report. The real problem for the taxpayers didn’t occur when the NY Fed failed to negotiate the return of some of the collateral in November, 2008. The problem occurred on September 16, when the Fed and the Treasury were suddenly faced with a collapsing AIG. Had there been any forethought and planning for such an event, the reaction could have been very different and far less panicky.

The first response should have been: ”Financial markets worldwide are frozen, and they are going to stay frozen for a long time no matter what we do with AIG." In hindsight, this is exactly what happened. The commercial paper market has taken nearly a year to recover a fraction of its previous activity, and this was only after the Fed had to guarantee transactions. Credit spreads took nine months to begin coming down to normal levels. Banks are lending to each other only because governments around the world now guarantee their bank activity, but banks are still not lending to corporations, small businesses, or individuals. The housing market in the US exists entirely on the generosity of Federally-managed firms like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHA. In other words, the disaster that the Fed faced on September 16 rolled on despite the rescue of AIG.

If AIG had been allowed to fail, the market would have learned a serious lesson about dealing with companies that act like banks but really have no controls or regulatory oversight like banks. The pain would have been greatest at the banks themselves. Some banks like Citigroup and Bank of America would have been even more crippled than they are now, but their current status as zombie banks would not be any different. The damage done to 401ks could have been mitigated by additional federal government guaranties, but even here the cost while enormous would have been less than what was spent paying off AIGFP’s credit default swaps at par.

Suppose you say that it is impossible to expect government bureaucrats to react on September 16 in any different manner. You can argue that any normal person would have panicked too, and that tough-nosed regulators like Gerald Corrigan don’t come around all that often – in fact these days they are all working for Goldman Sachs. Fine. Where, then, was the prudential planning for this catastrophe. All it would have taken is someone in advance of the crisis – a clever lawyer for example – inserting one clause in the agreements with banks before any collateral was posted with them. It would have said “The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reserves the right at any time to demand immediate repayment of any or all amounts of collateral posted with Bank X, with no compensation required to be paid to Bank X in any form by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Bank X hereby waives all rights to petition for a legal stay of said repayment.” If the banks didn’t like this clause, they wouldn’t get their collateral. They could go ahead and sue the government for breach of contract, but in the meantime they would be experiencing real pain with their CDO portfolio and the pressure would be on them to settle. Once the collateral was out the door, the Fed lost all leverage with the banks, and this is why the November negotiations were a foregone conclusion and a waste of time.

Finally, what is fundamentally missing at the Fed and the Treasury, and certainly now with two successive administrations and almost all 535 public servants in Congress, is the sense that the big financial institutions which have created this monstrous mess are dispensible. The problems that have arisen due to their avarice and misjudgments are only going to be solved over time, and are best solved in bankruptcy courts or through FDIC closure processes, not by making these institutions wards of the state until 10 or so years later they are nursed back to health. The public can and has been protected through deposit insurance, but the collapse of lending and credit in general has not been mitigated one whit by anything done so far to rescue these institutions. Let them die a merciful, quick death if death is their fate anyway. We will all of us individually benefit from such mercy as well.



Thursday, November 19, 2009

Grayson Remarks On The Passing Of The Paul-Grayson Amendment As Well As A Full List Of Voters

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/grayson-remarks-passing-paul-grayson-amendment-well-full-list-voters



AL-06 Rep. Spencer Bachus yay
CA-12 Rep. Jackie Speier yay
CA-22 Rep. Kevin McCarthy yay
CA-27 Rep. Brad Sherman yay
CA-35 Rep. Maxine Waters nay
CA-40 Rep. Edward R. Royce yay
CA-42 Rep. Gary G. Miller nay
CA-43 Rep. Joe Baca nay
CA-48 Rep. John Campbell yay
CO-07 Rep. Ed Perlmutter yay
CT-04 Rep. Jim Himes nay
DE-01 Rep. Michael N. Castle yay
FL-08 Rep. Alan Grayson yay
FL-12 Rep. Adam Putnam yay
FL-15 Rep. Bill Posey yay
FL-22 Rep. Ron Klein nay
FL-24 Rep. Suzanne Kosmas

GA-06 Rep. Tom Price yay
GA-13 Rep. David Scott yay
ID-01 Rep. Walt Minnick yay
IL-04 Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez nay
IL-08 Rep. Melissa L. Bean nay

IL-13 Rep. Judy Biggert yay
IL-14 Rep. Bill Foster nay
IL-16 Rep. Donald A. Manzullo yay
IN-02 Rep. Joe Donnelly nay
IN-07 Rep. Andre Carson nay

KS-02 Rep. Lynn Jenkins yay
KS-03 Rep. Dennis Moore nay
MA-04 Rep. Barney Frank nay

MA-08 Rep. Michael E. Capuano nay
MA-09 Rep. Stephen F. Lynch nay

MI-09 Rep. Gary Peters yay
MI-11 Rep. Thaddeus McCotter yay
MN-03 Rep. Erik Paulsen yay
MN-05 Rep. Keith Ellison nay
MN-06 Rep. Michele Bachmann yay
MO-01 Rep. William Lacy Clay yay
MO-05 Rep. Emanuel Cleaver nay
MS-01 Rep. Travis Childers yay
NC-03 Rep. Walter B. Jones yay
NC-10 Rep. Patrick T. McHenry yay
NC-12 Rep. Melvin L. Watt nay
NC-13 Rep. Brad Miller nay
NH-02 Rep. Paul W. Hodes yay
NJ-03 Rep. John Adler yay
NJ-05 Rep. Scott Garrett yay
NJ-07 Rep. Leonard Lance yay
NY-03 Rep. Peter King yay
NY-04 Rep. Carolyn McCarthy yay
NY-05 Rep. Gary L. Ackerman nay
NY-06 Rep. Gregory W. Meeks nay

NY-12 Rep. Nydia M. Velázquez yay
NY-14 Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney nay
NY-25 Rep. Dan Maffei yay
NY-26 Rep. Christopher Lee yay
OH-01 Rep. Steve Driehaus yay
OH-06 Rep. Charles Wilson nay
OH-15 Rep. Mary Jo Kilroy nay

OK-03 Rep. Frank D. Lucas yay
PA-06 Rep. Jim Gerlach yay
PA-11 Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski
SC-03 Rep. J. Gresham Barrett yay
TX-05 Rep. Jeb Hensarling yay
TX-09 Rep. Al Green nay
TX-14 Rep. Ron Paul yay
TX-15 Rep. Rubén Hinojosa yay
TX-19 Rep. Randy Neugebauer yay
TX-24 Rep. Kenny Marchant yay
WI-04 Rep. Gwen Moore nay
WV-02 Rep. Shelley Moore Capito nay


Friday, November 13, 2009

All the gold that was left in Fort Knox was now owned by the Federal Reserve a group of private bankers as collateral against the national debt.



In response to a query from a GATA member, we share some information

about the U.S. gold reserves and Fort Knox. This is followed by a small
miscellany of members' postings, to interest and, with respect to GATA
taking over Governor's Island, Manhattan, perhaps amuse you.

FOR GATA, For Gold,

Boudewijn Wegerif (Bodwin)
Moderator GATA E-mail Group
- - - - -
1.
GATA member E.J. Sheldon wants an audit on U.S. gold holdings and wrote
to Congressman Jim Saxton about this on March 19:

"I told him that the best thing he could do for the good ole USA is
demand an audit of all U.S. gold reserves to immediately find out what
our true gold position is. I believe that all of the gold is not where
it should be and only an audit will reveal where the gold went, to whom,
and for what price, and what reason. Your thoughts are welcome."

GO GATA comment:
All GATA members will be very interested to see Jim Saxton's reply, when
and if he does reply. In the meantime, here is some interesting info on
the subject, from the script of the video film, The Money Masters (for
details about the video, visit www.themoneymasters.com):

"Most Americans still believe that all that gold is still at Fort Knox.
At the end of World War II, Fort Knox contained 701.8 million ounces of
gold, an incredible 70% of all the gold in the world. How much remains?
No one knows. Despite the fact that Federal law requires an annual
physical audit of Fort Knox gold, the Treasury has consistently refused
to conduct one. The truth is that a reliable audit of whatever
remains here has not been conducted since President Eisenhower ordered
one in 1953."

Where did Americas gold in Fort Knox go? It is said that by 1971, when
the dollar was "freed" from the gold standard, "all the pure gold had
been secretly removed from Fort Knox much of it drained back through
the Fed to the Bank of England. Once the gold was gone from Fort Knox,
President Nixon closed the gold window by repealing Roosevelt's Gold
Reserve Act of 1934, finally making it legal once again for Americans to
buy gold. "

So how did the story about the disappearance of Fort Knox gold get out?
Well, "It all started with an article in a New York periodical in 1974.
The article charged that the Rockefeller family was manipulating the
Federal Reserve to sell off Fort Knox gold at bargain basement prices to
anonymous European speculators. Three days later, the anonymous source
of the story, Louise Auchincloss Boyer, mysteriously fell to her death
from the window of her 10th floor apartment in New York. How would Mrs.
Boyer have known of the Rockefeller connection to the Fort Knox gold
heist? She was the longtime secretary of Nelson Rockefeller."

"For the next 14 years, Ed Durell, a wealthy Ohio industrialist, devoted
himself to a quest for the truth concerning the Fort Knox gold. He
wrote thousands of letters to over 1,000 government and banking
officials, trying to find out how much gold was really left and where
the rest of it had gone. . .

"Unfortunately, Ed Durell never did accomplish his primary goal, a full
audit of the gold reserves in Fort Knox. . .

"What is the government so afraid of. Here's the answer. When
President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, his conservative friends
urged him to study the feasibility of returning to a gold standard as
the only way to curb government spending. It sounded like a reasonable
alternative, so President Reagan appointed a group of men called the
Gold Commission, to study the situation and report back.

"What Reagan's Gold Commission reported back to Congress in 1982 was the
following shocking revelation concerning gold. The Treasury owned no
gold at all. All the gold that was left in Fort Knox was now owned by
the Federal Reserve a group of private bankers as collateral
against the national debt. Much of the rest of it was still in the
U.S., in the vaults beneath the New York Federal Reserve Bank, but held
there for its bank and foreign owners."

- - - - -
2.
Jim Shanahan is getting the hang of e-mailing politicos. He tells us:
"In my previous life I spent 27 years in the Marine Corps, not a career
which inclines one toward writing Congressmen. However, this blatant
manipulation of PM prices finally pi**ed me off enough to write to
Congressman Jim Saxton. Now that I've got the hang of it I think I will
write some other Congressmen and Senators. One email may not weigh much
but the weight of hundreds will get positive attention. "

Write On, Jim !

- - - - -
3.
Sunshine Mining is the largest silver mining company in the US, plus
they mine a bit of gold. Jim Bruce wrote them:

"As a shareholder I would like to know if you folks are currently
hedging gold and silver. If so could you give me some information
regarding how much of your production is hedged?

Thanks for your timely response."

Sunshine Mining's Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer,
William W. Davis, replied:

"Thank you for your inquiry. We have done no hedging, and would not at
these low silver prices."

- - - - -
4.
Rod Michel wrote to Senator Richard G. Lugar in Indiana for GATA and
received this reply:

"Thank you for writing my office. I note your views on regulating hedge
funds. I also have serious concerns with the current regulatory
treatment of hedge funds. I held a hearing last December in the Senate
Agriculture Committee to further study the issue.

The near-collapse of Long Term Capital Management hedge fund caused many
policy makers, including myself, to re-evaluate the current regulatory
structure surrounding hedge funds. As Chairman of the Agriculture
Committee, which has jurisdiction over the futures market, I wanted a
better understanding of how the LTCM situation might impact the futures
industry, the agricultural sector and the public in general. Based on
the testimony of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, I
came away with the belief that bank lending practices should be
tightened.

This has already begun to occur as a result of market discipline and
regulatory oversight. More regulation might be necessary. The
President's Working Group is near completion of a study on hedge funds.
I anxiously await the findings from this study, and will carefully
consider any recommendations it might have for Congress.

I appreciate your thoughtful views on this issue."

Rod Michel has also begun educating executives of several Vancouver
Junior Gold exploration companies as to who GATA is and how the markets
are hurting them and all investors.

- - - - -
5.
Finally, we are not sure if he is serious or not, but Michel Roux has
proposed:

"How about GATA trying to get the N.Y.Island to help the miners who lost
their job because of the government meddling in the gold business, also
to help the investors who have lost money too because of government
intervention. This surely would make the news. If the farmers can, why
not the miners? This post below was copied from the Kitco board. It was
written by Philip Brasher of Associated Press Washington ( AP ),
Datelined March 19:

"Farmers are looking to take Manhattan or at least nearby Governors
Island. At the prodding of some farm-state members, the Senate Budget
Committee agreed to speed up the sale of Governors Island to subsidize
improvements in federal crop insurance. The 173-acre island off the tip
of Manhattan was a military base for more than 300 years until the Coast
Guard closed down operations in 1997.

"Turning that island over to the private sector would probably be a good
thing, and heaven knows we need to scratch wherever we can to find some
additional dollars,' Sen. Tim Johnson, D-S.D., said today. President
Clinton has offered to give it to New York for $1, provided it is used
for public purposes. But Congress two years ago ordered it to be
auctioned in 2002 for $500 million as part of a plan to balance the
budget.

"New York officials have since been struggling to devise a plan for
developing the island. . ."

GO GATA COMMENT:
If you have any ideas, with or without tongue in cheek, lets hear from
you.

Monday, November 9, 2009

You've Been Bamboozled, Hoodwinked and Lied To! Here's the Proof. What Are You Going to Do About It?

Reggie Middleton's picture

Yes, you've been bamboozled! Hoodwinked! You're being taken for suckers that not only can't count, but whose memories have been washed away by threats of swine flu and reality TV shows. Do not fret, though. What I have is PROOF of the great Banking Bamboozle, for all to see. Now, armed with this proof, all I need for you is to go out and do something about it. Don't sit there staring at your screen, thinking "damn, he's got a point". Send a copy of this proof along with your comments to all of your elected officials, congressspersons, senators, bankers, insurers, business partners and the media outlet of your choice. The other alternative is... Maybe the powers that be have a point and threats of swine flu combined with the latest episode of survivor and flowery proclamations of "green shoots" amid 10.2% unemployment is all it takes to pull the wool over your eyes. We shall see, shall we??? This is a fact and figures packed blog post, complete with a plethora of downloadable models and references. Please do take the time to read through it before you return to your daily dose of government recommended "American Idol"... Yes, my goal is to piss you off! To goad you into action! To elicit a response.... and it gets worse as you read on.

I have compartmentalized this rather lenghty, yet interesting (to the right people) diatribe into major segments. Feel free to skp ahead or pick and choose the ones which most interest you - or if you have been freshly unplugged from the Matirx, I suggest you sit back with a good glass of wine and read through this entire missive:

  1. Social mobility: The reason why the big banks are being protected at all costs and on the breaking backs of the unemployed taxpayer
  2. The truth behind the Stress Tests and Unemployment
  3. The truth behind credit loss assumptions: Where the hell did the stress test numbers come from?
  4. The Grand Finale: So, what banks are in trouble and how much trouble are they in? A very granular and unprecedented look at the weaknesses of some of the anointed 19 that you cannot get from anywhere else!

You may have seen bits and pieces of stress test analysis in other blogs and news sites, but I doubt if you have seen all pieces of the pie stitched together, as below. You see, many complain about Goldman Sach's $40 billion of bonuses during a time of near depression, but as all who bother to even consider have probably summarized - this government is ran by, and ran for, the capitalist class. If you even have to ask a question after this statement, you can be rest assured you are not part of that class that the government truly serves. In preparation for the social mobility thesis behind the protection of the banks below, you should download this handy-dandy model that shows you (in full detail) where YOU stand in the grand scheme of socio-economic stratification, or to put it more simply, how much the powers that be believe CNBC can effect your behavior (quick registration is required, you may choose the free option to subscribe) - Socio-economic stratification model Socio-economic stratification model 2008-11-07 13:47:25 156.00 Kb. For many, going through this model is the equivalent of choosing between the blue and red pill in the Matrix, literally risking an unjacking from the network of make believe.

For those who feel you must get offended when social class is discussed, I strongly suggest you stop here and watch Cramer scream BUY! BUY! BUY! or otherwise get a solid dose of MSM, mind numbing programming. For the rest of you who choose to continue reading, you have just chosen the Blue Pill - prepare to be unplugged from the Matrix!

Social Mobility: The Reason Why the Big Banks Are Being Protected. Unlike the Jefferson's, We're moving on down!

Social class is defined (on this blog) as the amount of control one has over one's socio-economic environment. It is much more than money, although money is a large component. For instance, Barack Obama is in a higher class than Robert DeNiro or Derek Jeter, although Robert DeNiro and Derek Jeter are most likely wealthier (although that is quite debatable after taking into consideration the value of Obama's campaign contribution list and membership database from his social networking site!). Obama's higher class stems from his ability to exert more control over his socio-economic environment. The factors that this author uses to determine class combine (with the associated weights) to create a "socioeconomic index":

Socioeconomic Index=

(Occupation X 12) + (Income source X12) + (Income X 7) + (Wealth X 14) +

(Education X 7) + (Dwelling area X 15) + (Class Consciousness X 7) +

(Housing X 12)

As you can see, wealth is the largest contributor to the class standing, and coincidentally it is the factor that is the most at risk in this current economic climate. I believe that there will be a significant entry into the upper middle class by those who were once firmly entrenched into the upper classes! While that may not seem like a big deal to many, it is damn big deal to those who are moving down the ladder. This also means, that there will be some space for others to move (relatively speaking) up the ladder into the capitalist class. One man's (or woman's) misfortune is another's opportunity.

Lower Strata Underclass/Poor

Working Poor
Middle Strata Lower Middle Class

Upper Middle Class
Upper Strata Lower Upper Class <-- 20% to 30% of BoomBustBloggers are here, roughly 1,500 of you!

Higher Upper Class - the Capitalist Class

Social Mobility is the name of the game in times of severe dislocation - times like we are experiencing now. It is the endgame of the extant capitalist class to convince the populace, both by means of government misinformation and disinformation disseminated through the mainstream media, that the current severe economic dislocation is over and we are well on the path to economic recovery. Economic recovery in this sense during this period can also be read as the cementing of the status quo for the capitalist class! Everytime a member of the capitalist oligarchy stumbles from its perch (usually in times of severe economic dislocation), a driven member from a lower rung on the socio-economic food chain rises to takes its place. The goal of the capitalist class is to prevent that lower rung member from rising "BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY!" Hence the "protect the banks at any cost" scenarios that you see coming from Paulson, Geithner, et. al. The mantra that you hear being preached by the guardians of the gates of the Capitalist Class, saying "we barely averted catastrophe!", "The demise of XYZ (or GS) bank will bring upon us the end of the World as we know it", or any other nonsensical drama, is simply propaganda to frighten the sheeple into stepping in line, lockstep behind the minions of the Capitalist Class. Banks have been failing for thousands of years and the world moved on, without so much as a hiccup in the vast majority of cases. The world will come to an end as we know it for those members of the Capitalist Class that were closely associated to any bank that fails, which is why you here the aforementioned mantra from the minions of the Capitalist Class. Hey, I need for those underperforming banks to fail - for they are dragging on the productivity of this country like some royalty receiving wealth and influence from birthright rather than from merit or performance, and the failure of such institutions will enrich this country by allowing the hybrid vigor of the true capitalistic producers (as opposed to the rigid caste-like capitalist class) to move into the capitalist rung on the ladder and truly produce value.

The massive amounts of extremely valuable, and apparently low cost (relatively) or absolutely free information disseminated from sources such as BoomBustBlog or ZeroHedge are attempts at equalizing the effect of the Capitalist Class Oligarchy, thus enabling social mobility through awareness. You see, when you are on top of the ladder, social mobility can only mean bad things. For everyone else, it can hold the promise of better things to come. Once you are aware of how these things break down, you will see many settings in a different light. Again, here is the BoomBustBlog class model (based loosely upon the Index of Status Characteristics) available for download to anyone interested in delving into this further (quick registration is required, you may choose the free option to subscribe). See xls boombustblog.com_social_class_model v.7.3 156.00 Kb.

Now, on to those Stress Tests!

Let's take a walk through recent history... Earlier this year, in an attempt to assuage the fear of bank insolvency, the government issued what amounted to "take home" stress tests for the big US banks. These tests were known as SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program) tests. I have warned about the inaccuracies of these tests in the spring (see Welcome to the Big Bank Bamboozle and More-on-Reggie-Middletons-Bank-Stress-Testing), but now with the benefit of hindsight I will systematically go through the aspects of these tests which SEVERELY overestimated the strengths of the banks in question, with ample evidence sprinkled throughout.

The Unemployment Figures Used in the Stress Tests Have Proven to be Fantasy, at the Very Best!

The stress tests assumed a worst case scenario for unemployment to be 8.9% in 2009 (see pages 8 and 9 in pdf scap_design_and_implementation 06/11/2009,23:08 286.90 Kb). As the facts stand now, the unemployment rate rose from 9.8% in September to 10.2% in October 2009 (see U.S. Unemployment Jumps to 10.2%, Prompting Obama to Pledge Fresh Measures). The long-term unemployment rate (including marginally attached job seekers and workers who are discouraged or part-time for economic reasons) rose from 17% in September to 17.5% in October 2009. (U.S. BLS)

scap_unemployment.png

As you can see, the major driver of future bank credit losses has been woefully underestimated, and thus the capital requirements of said banks have been woefully underestimated, among other things. We shall get to that in detail later on in this missive. For now...

scap_assumptions.png

The stress test assumptions worst case scenario was off by 130 basis points for 2009 and we are currently in uncharted territory since we pierced the worse case scenario for the entire prediction term of the assumption period (the 10.2% number was for October and we are trending sharply higher).

Even the Federal Reserve was more pessimistic shortly after the government agreed to let most banks pay back TARP and allegedly "passing" the stress tests. Despite this, last minute epiphany they were still significantly too optimistic. The U.S. Federal Reserve estimated unemployment at 9.2%-9.6% for Q4 2009 and 9%-9.5% for Q4 2010, off by up to a full 100 basis points, but still better than what they allowed the banks to project losses with.

More data tidbits before we move on:

  • Reggie Middleton said, "I told you so" when this farce first got started: More-on-Reggie-Middletons-Bank-Stress-Testing
  • The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS): The job openings rate in August 2009 was unchanged at 1.8%. The number of job openings has declined 50% since the peak in June 2007. The hires rate at 3.1% is at a low and the separation rate remained at a record low of 3.3%. (U.S. BLS) This implies that job losses in recent months have slowed mostly due to lesser layoffs while hiring is still subdued.
  • Economist Michael Feroli, JP Morgan: The August JOLTS report shows that the number of unemployed/underutilized workers per job vacancy rose to 10.9 in August 2009. The continued increase in this ratio will put downward pressure on wages. The Beveridge curve (showing the inverse relationship between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate) derived from the JOLTS survey is consistent with a rising natural rate of unemployment. (via the October 9, 2009 report 'Bad News and Good News in the August JOLTS)
  • Going forward, the economy needs 100,000-150,000 job creation per month to employ the growing labor force, and over 200,000-250,000 job creation per month to recover the jobs lost during this recession. The jobless recovery might therefore keep the unemployment rate high for a few years.
  • Professor Brad Delong, University of California Berkley: The increase in the unemployment rate during this cycle has been much greater relative to the contraction in real GDP, implying that Okun's Law is broken. (via Macroblog; 07/23/09)
  • Dr. Nouriel Roubini: All elements of total labor income--jobs, hours and average hourly wages--are under pressure, which will impact consumption in the coming months. The unemployment rate in late 2009 will be higher than what was assumed for 2010 in the adverse scenario of the banks' stress tests. This will lead to further delinquencies on loans and securities and lower-than-expected recovery rates. As people with mortgages lose their jobs, they will have severe difficulties servicing their mortgages. (07/02/09)
  • Bridgewater Associates: "Normally, labor markets lag the economy because incremental spending transactions are financed via debt, stimulated by interest rate cuts. But as long as credit remains frozen and in a deleveraging environment, job growth becomes an important leading, causal indicator of demand and other economic conditions. The deterioration in labor market will continue because companies' profit margins are so deeply damaged (amid the slowdown in consumer spending and credit crunch) that a little bounce in growth won't do much to alter their need to cut costs." (via Thoughts from the Frontline; 05/15/09)
  • Bloomberg reports that the increase in temporary work hiring may foreshadow an increase in permanent hiring (see Temp-Worker Increase May Foreshadow Return to US Job Growth Nov. 6 ...). There is another way of looking at that though. Mary Daly, Bart Hobijn and Joyce Kwok, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: Given relatively lower temporary layoffs and greater increase in part-time workers, the "level of labor market slack would be higher by the end of 2009 than experienced at any other time in the post-World War II period, implying a longer and slower recovery path for the unemployment rate. When the economy rebounds, employers will tap into their existing workforces rather than hire new workers." (06/05/09)
  • Senior Economist Edward S. Knotek II and Research Associate Stephen Terry, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: A banking crisis coinciding with a recession and recent rends in the labor market suggest that "unemployment will recover much more slowly from this recession than past episodes of severe recession may suggest." (08/13/09)
  • Professor Edmund Phelps, Columbia University: The non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) may rise above the current 5.5% to 6.5% or 7%. (via Bloomberg, May 26, 2009)
  • OCED: The significant increase in unemployment during the recession and in the long term will lead to an increase in structural unemployment by 2010 and beyond. (06/09)

The truth behind credit loss assumptions: Where did the stress test numbers come from? They came from the guys that were actually being tested. It's the world's largest take-home test!

On several occasions, I have released research that explicit details the default rates, and as an extension, the loss and recovery rates behind residential mortgages in most states in the US (by combining the default rates with the Case Shiller data) - see "the open source mortgage default model", the downloadable, open source default and loss rate model (free registration required): Revised SCAP Assumptions Public Open Source Version 1.1 Revised SCAP Assumptions Public Open Source Version 1.1 2009-05-18 15:15:47 1.21 Mb and "Green Shoots are Being Fertilized by Brown Turds in the Mortgage Markets" (these links are must read items - they contain megabytes of government sourced, empirical loss data that directly contradicts what was offered in the SCAP tests). The aforelinked document is also available as a .pdf for download (with additional commentary) after a free registration: BoomBustBlog.com's Realistic Recast of SCAP BoomBustBlog.com's Realistic Recast of SCAP 2009-05-12 14:52:09. Much of this info came directly from the NY Fed and the FDIC, hence it was readily available to the Federal Reserve and the Treasury as well. Despite this, the SCAP tests used much more optimistic numbers than the NY Fed's own findings, and the results are becoming apparent as I type this.

#ffffff;"> #ffffff;">Reference Fannie Mae's recent credit losses - Fannie’s Draws From Emergency Treasury Fund Reach $60 Billion ...Then there is evidence of further distress at other mortgage insurers: AIG Taps U.S. for $4.2 Billion to Help Restructure ILFC, Mortgage Insurer.

Ambac Insurance Unit May Be Put in Receivership, JPMorgan Says (JPM is a year and a half late. I told you this back in 2007, see#0000ff;"> Ambac is Effectively Insolvent & Will See More than $8 Billion of Losses with Just a $2.26 Billion#0000ff;"> and #0000ff;">Follow up to the Ambac Analysis) and on the consumer finance front Consumer Credit Declines More Than Forecast as American Job Losses Persist.

#ffffff;"> This is a must read document for anyone who has bothered to venture this far into the blog post (registration required to download): BoomBustBlog.com's Realistic Recast of SCAP BoomBustBlog.com's Realistic Recast of SCAP 2009-05-12 14:52:09. It was generated using data culled directly from the NY Fed's and the FDIC websites. I have created an open source model of this data for all to use at their discretion (registration required to download): Revised SCAP Assumptions Public Open Source Version 1.1 Revised SCAP Assumptions Public Open Source Version 1.1 2009-05-18 15:15:47 1.21 Mb

#ffffff;"> Here are a few key excerpts...

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Geographic breakdown of Alt A loans

geo_alt_a_delinquencies.png

Source: New York Fed

I have warned about Alt A loans in the beginning of the year - see The banking backdrop for 2009. As of April 30, 2009 there were nearly 2 mn Alt A loans outstanding, each with an average balance of $321,293, representing $651 bn (down from $658 bn in March 2009) of total Alt A loans (avg FICO score of 705). California with 43.8% of total Alt A loans (avg FICO score of 709) had the largest share of Alt A loans followed by Florida (9.4% of total Alt A with avg FICO score of 700) and New York (5.6% of Alt A loans with avg FICO score of 704).

Is there collusion amongst the banks to drive up the prices of Toxic Assets?

#ffff99;">

#ffffff; font-size: 10pt;">Last year, the government offered a public/private investment program that used taxpayer funds to assist private investors in leveraging up to purchase toxic assets off of bank balance sheets. I made immediate, and public, note that this program was rife with possibilities of collusion amongst the banks and loopholes ready to be abused. I even created a model for congress to peruse which detailed a few of the possibilities. See (free registration required):

#ffffff;"> PPIP full model, with collusion and implied leverage PPIP full model, with collusion and implied leverage 2009-03-26 01:00:41 202.00 Kb. Miraculously, within months, toxic asset prices started floating higher. Hmmm! I am not saying outright collusion did occur, but it really does smell fishy.

#ffffff;"> For those of you want to know what the stress tests results of the big banks were if they used the NY Fed/FDIC official loss data, I have run the numbers for you. It doesn't look very pretty in some cases. This content is paid subscriber-only, except for the two links that have public-lite and public excerpt included! Let's walk through the PNC free data, in light of how misleading their latest quarterly report was (see For those that didn't notice - Reggie Middleton on PNCl Q3-09 Results and then be sure to read At What Point Does Accounting Gimmickery Become an Outright Lie? Let's Ask PNC).

#ffffff;"> Click any of these graphics to enlarge...

pnc_stress1.png

#ffffff;"> Notice the amount of leverage that PNC is using if one were to use the NY Fed and FDIC data in lieu of what PNC has proffered through their take home test.

#ffffff;"> pnc_stress2.png

#ffffff;"> As you can see from above, there is a significant difference between what the government's SCAP tests reveal PNC will lose and what the government's NY Fed and FDIC call sheet data says PNC will lose - a very significant difference. Solely as a result of looking at this chart, one should be willing to demand a second round of considerably more stringent stress testing.

#ffffff;"> pnc_stress3.png

#ffffff;"> If one were to granularly break down the foreseen losses to PNC's portfolio using the government data...

#ffffff;"> pnc_stress4.png

#ffffff;"> As you can see, going through each major loan category in PNC's books reveals a much LESS optimistic scenario than ANY portrayed in their SCAP take home test results...

#ffffff;"> In an act of near unprecedented generosity, I have included the PNC valuation along with the Blackrock contribution in the free PNC lite public download below (in alphabetical order).

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Subscriber content that reveals what the banks truly require in terms of capital and cushions and the actual rate of losses to come.

#ffffff;"> Goldman Sachs Stress Test Professional Goldman Sachs Stress Test Professional 2009-04-20 10:06:45 4.04 Mb

Goldman Sachs Stress Test Retail Goldman Sachs Stress Test Retail 2009-04-20 10:08:06 720.25 Kb

MS Simulated Government Stress Test MS Simulated Government Stress Test 2009-05-05 11:36:25 2.49 Mb

MS Stess Test Model Assumptions and Stress Test Valuation MS Stess Test Model Assumptions and Stress Test Valuation 2009-04-22 07:55:17 339.99 Kb

PNC SCAP Results recast using FDIC and NY Fed data - Pro PNC SCAP Results recast using FDIC and NY Fed data - Pro 2009-05-15 07:31:21 455.37 Kb

PNC SCAP Results recast using FDIC and NY Fed data - Retail PNC SCAP Results recast using FDIC and NY Fed data - Retail 2009-05-15 07:30:25 395.18 Kb

PNC Stress Test Pro PNC Stress Test Pro 2009-04-13 02:10:17 3.11 Mb

PNC Stress Test update - Professional PNC Stress Test update - Professional 2009-04-21 15:55:56 3.00 Mb

PNC Stress Test Retail PNC Stress Test Retail 2009-04-13 02:11:08 323.51 Kb

PNC Stress Test update - Retail PNC Stress Test update - Retail 2009-04-21 15:53:52 777.50 Kb

PNC stress test write up - public lite PNC stress test write up - public lite 2009-07-27 02:37:11 995.30 Kb

Sun Trust Banks Simulated Government Stress Test Sun Trust Banks Simulated Government Stress Test 2009-05-05 11:37:13 1016.17 Kb

JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription 2009-09-22 14:33:53 1.51 Mb