You Can't Multiply Wealth by Dividing It

You Can't Multiply Wealth by Dividing It

Dec-15-2009

"You cannot legislate the poor into freedom by legislating the wealthy out of freedom. What one person receives without working for, another person must work for without receiving.The government cannot give to anybody anything that the government does not first take from somebody else. When half of the people get the idea that they do not have to work because the other half is going to take care of them, and when the other half gets the idea that it does no good to work because somebody else is going to get what they work for, that my dear friend, is about the end of any nation. You cannot multiply wealth by dividing it." - Dr. Adrian Rogers, 1931

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Thu, April 29, 2010 10:00:18 AM Washington Post article: "The Immigration Debate" - should be called "The Illegal Immigration Debate" - what a farce

Please ensure when you discuss this issue in public and private to refer to it as the illegal immigration issue, and not "the immigration issue".

Washington Post article: "The Immigration Debate" - should be called "The Illegal Immigration Debate"

Why does the media insist on calling this an Immigration issue?

- A travesty of deliberate twisting of the words to incite hate and anger.

Our country was and is built on LEGAL immigrants.

Why do the people hold signs saying immigrants have rights?

We already know this, America provides rights for citizen immigrants, it is common knowledge what the laws are.

But this does not apply to ILLEGAL immigrants. Change the laws don't break them and then demand amnesty.

Perhaps bank robbers should be given amnesty too?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/29/AR2010042900744.html

Sucked Dry: the Late, Great State of California

http://www.counterpunch.org/hudson01262010.html

Which Economy is Obama Talking About?

Myths of Recovery

By MICHAEL HUDSON

The State of the Union address is in danger of purveying the usual euphemisms. I expect Obama to brag that he has overseen a recovery. But can there be any such thing as a jobless recovery? What has recovered are stock market averages and Wall Street bonuses, not disposable personal income or discretionary spending after paying debt service.

There is a dream that what can be “recovered” is something so idyllic as to be mythical: a Bubble Economy enabling people to make money without actually working, by borrowing and riding the tide of asset-price inflation to make capital gains. Corporate Democrat Harold Ford Jr. writes nostalgically that Bill Clinton’s eight years in office created 22 million jobs, “balanced the budget and left his successor with a surplus. This can be done again,” if only Obama moves further to the right (which Ford calls the center, meaning the Bayhs and Republicans).

It can’t be done again. Pres. Clinton’s administration balanced the budget by “welfare reform” to cut back public spending. This would be lethal today. Meanwhile, his explosion of bank credit and the dot.com boom (rising stock prices and bonuses without any earnings) fueled the early stages of the Greenspan bubble. It was a debt-leveraged illusion. Instead of the government running budget deficits to expand domestic demand, Clinton left it to banks to extend interest-bearing credit-debt pollution that we are still struggling to clean up.

The danger is that when Obama speaks of “stabilizing the economy,” he means trying to sustain the rise in compound interest and debt. This mathematical financial dynamic is autonomous from the “real” industrial economy, overwhelming it economically. That is what makes the present economic road to debt peonage so self-defeating.

Debts that can’t be paid, won’t be. So defaults are rising. The question that Obama should be addressing is how to deal with the excess of debt above the ability to pay – and of negative equity for the one-quarter of U.S. real estate that has a higher mortgage debt than the market price is worth. If the hope is still to “borrow our way out of debt” by getting the banks to start lending again, then listeners on Wednesday will know that Obama’s second year in office will be worse for the economy than his first.

How realistic is it to expect the speech to make clear that “we can’t go home again”? Obama promised change. “We simply cannot return to business as usual,” he said on Jan. 21, introducing the “Volcker plan.” But how can there be meaningful structural change if the plan is to return to an idealized dynamic that enriched Wall Street but not the rest of the economy?

The word “recession” implies that economic trends will return to normal almost naturally.

Any dream of “recovery” in today’s debt-leveraged economy is a false hope. Yet high financial circles expect Obama to insist that the economy cannot recover without first reimbursing and enriching Wall Street. To re-inflate asset prices, Obama’s team looks to Japan’s post-1990 model. A compliant Federal Reserve is to flood the credit markets to lower interest rates to revive bank lending –- interest-bearing debt borrowed to buy real estate already in place (and stocks and bonds already issued), enabling banks to work out of their negative equity position by inflating asset prices relative to wages.

The promise is that re-inflating prices will help the “real” economy. But what will “recover” is the rising trend of consumer and homeowner debt responsible for stifling the economy with debt deflation in the first place. This end-result of the Clinton-Bush bubble economy is still being applauded as a model for recovery.

We are not really emerging from a “recession.” The word means literally a falling below a trend line. The economy cannot “recover” its past exponential growth, because it was not really normal. GDP is rising mainly for the FIRE sector – finance, insurance and real estate – not the “real economy.” Financial and corporate managers are paying themselves more for their success in paying their employees less.

This is the antithesis of recovery for Main Street. That is what makes the FIRE sector so self-destructive, and what has ended America’s great post-1945 upswing.

There are two economies – and the extractive FIRE sector dominates the “real” economy

When listening to the State of the Union speech, one should ask just which economy Obama means when he talks about recovery. Most wage earners and taxpayers will think of the “real” economy of production and consumption. But Obama believes that this “Economy #1” is dependent on that of Wall Street. His major campaign contributors and “wealth creators” in the FIRE sector – Economy #2, wrapped around the “real” Economy #1.

Economy #2 is the “balance sheet” economy of property and debt. The wealthiest 10 per cent lend out their savings to become debts owed by the bottom 90 per cent. A rising share of gains are made in extractive ways, by charging rent and interest, by financial speculation (“capital gains”), and by shifting taxes off itself onto the “real” Economy #1.

John Edwards talked about “the two economies,” but never explained what he meant operationally. Back in the 1960s when Michael Harrington wroteThe Other America, the term meant affluent vs. poor America. For 19th-century novelists such as Charles Dickens and Benjamin Disraeli, it referred to property owners vs. renters. Today, it is finance vs. debtors. Any discussion of economic polarization betweens rich and poor must focus on the deepening indebtedness of most families, companies, real estate, cities and states to an emerging financial oligarchy.

Financial oligarchy is antithetical to democracy. That is what the political fight in Washington is all about today. The Corporate Democrats are trying to get democratically elected to bring about oligarchy. I hope that this is a political oxymoron, but I worry about how many people buy into the idea that “wealth creation” requires debt creation. While wealth gushes upward through the Wall Street financial siphon, trickle-down economic ideology fuels a Bubble Economy via debt-leveraged asset-price inflation.

The role of public spending – and hence budget deficits – no longer means taxing citizens to spend on improving their well-being within Economy #1. Since the 2008 financial meltdown the enormous rise in national debt has resulted from the reimbursing of Wall Street for its bad gambles on derivatives, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps that had little to do with the “real” economy. They could have been wiped out without bringing down the economy. That was an idle threat. A.I.G.’s swap insurance department could have collapsed (it was largely in London anyway) while keeping its normal insurance activities unscathed. But the government paid off the financial sector’s bad speculative debts by taking them onto the public balance sheet.

The economy is best viewed as the FIRE sector wrapped around the production and consumption core, extracting financial and rent charges that are not technologically or economically necessary costs.

Say’s Law of markets, taught to every economics student, states that workers and their employers use their wages and profits to buy what they produce (consumer goods and capital goods). Profits are earned by employing labor to produce goods and services to sell at a markup. (M – C – M’ to the initiated.)

The financial and property sector is wrapped around this core, siphoning off revenue from this circular flow. This FIRE sector is extractive. Its revenue takes the form of what classical economists called “economic rent,” a broad category that includes interest, monopoly super-profits (price gouging) and land rent, as well as “capital” gains. (These are mainly land-price gains and stock-market gains, not gains from industrial capital as such.) Economic rent and capital gains are income without a corresponding necessary cost of production (M – M’ to the initiated).

Banks have lent increasingly to buy up these rentier rights to extract interest, and less and less to promote industrial capital formation. Wealth creation” FIRE-style consists most easily of privatizing the public domain and erecting tollbooths to charge access fees for basic necessities such as health insurance, land sites, home ownership, the communication spectrum (cable and phone rights), patent medicine, water and electricity, and other public utilities, including the use of convenient money (credit cards), or the credit needed to get by. This kind of wealth is not what Adam Smith described in The Wealth of Nations. It is a form of overhead, not a means of production. The revenue it extracts is a zero-sum economic activity, meaning that one party’s gain (that of Wall Street usually) is another’s loss.

Debt deflation resulting from a distorted “financialized” economy

The problem that Obama faces is one that he cannot voice politically without offending his political constituency. The Bubble Economy has left families, companies, real estate and government so heavily indebted that they must use current income to pay banks and bondholders. The U.S. economy is in a debt deflation. The debt service they pay is not available for spending on goods and services. This is why sales are falling, shops are closing down and employment continues to be cut back.

Banks evidently do not believe that the debt problem can be solved. That is why they have taken the $13 trillion in bailout money and run – paying it out in bonuses, or buying other banks and foreign affiliates. They see the domestic economy as being all loaned up. The game is over. Why would they make yet more loans against real estate already in negative equity, with mortgage debt in excess of the market price that can be recovered? Banks are not writing more “equity lines of credit” against homes or making second mortgages in today’s market, so consumers cannot use rising mortgage debt to fuel their spending.

Banks also are cutting back their credit card limits. They are “earning their way out of debt,” making up for the bad gambles they have taken with depositor funds, by raising interest rates, penalties and fees, by borrowing low-interest credit from the Federal Reserve and investing it abroad – preferably in currencies rising against the dollar. This is what Japan did in the “carry trade.” It kept the yen’s exchange rate down, and it is lowering the dollar’s exchange rate today. This threatens to raise prices for imports, on which domestic consumer prices are based. So easy credit for Wall Street means a cost squeeze for consumers.

The President needs a better set of advisors. But Wall Street has obtained veto power over just who they should be. Control over the President’s ear time has been part of the financial sector’s takeover of government. Wall Street has threatened that the stock market will plunge if oligarch-friendly Fed Chairman Bernanke is not reappointed. Obama insists on keeping him on board, in the belief that what’s good for Wall Street is good for the economy at large.

But what’s good for the banks is a larger market for their credit – more debt for the families and companies that are their customers, higher fees and penalties, no truth-in-lending laws, harsher bankruptcy terms, and further deregulation and bailouts.

This is the program that Bernanke has advised Washington to follow. Wall Street hopes that he will be kept on board. Bernanke’s advice has helped bolster that of Tim Geithner at Treasury and Larry Summers as chief advisor to convince Pres. Obama that “recovery” requires more credit.

Going down this road will make the debt overhead heavier, raising the cost of living and doing business. So we must beware of the President using the term “recovery” in his State of the Union speech to mean a recovery of debt and giving more money to Wall Street Jobs cannot revive without consumers having more to spend. And consumer demand (a hateful, jargon word, because only Wall Street and the Pentagon’s military-industrial complex really make demands) cannot be revived without reducing the debt burden. Bankers are refusing to write down mortgages and other debts to reflect the ability to pay. That act of economic realism would mean taking a loss on their bad debts. So they have asked the government to lend new buyers enough credit to re-inflate housing prices. This is the aim of the housing subsidy to new homebuyers. It leaves more revenue to be capitalized into higher mortgage loans to support prices for real estate fallen into negative equity.

The pretense is that this is subsidizing the middle class, but homebuyers are only the intermediaries for government credit (debt to be paid off by taxpayers) to mortgage bankers. Nearly 90 per cent of new home mortgages are being funded or guaranteed by the FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – all providing a concealed subsidy to Wall Street.

Obama’s most dangerous belief is in the myth that the economy needs the financial sector to lead its recovery by providing credit. Every economy needs a means of payment, which is why Wall Street has been able to threaten to wreck the economy if the government does not give in to its demands. But the monetary function should not be confused with predatory lending and casino gambling, not to mention Wall Street’s use of bailout funds on lobbying efforts to spread its gospel.

Deficit reduction

It seems absurd for politicians to worry that running a deficit from health care or Social Security can cause serious economic problems, after having given away $13 trillion to Wall Street and a blank check to the Pentagon. The “stimulus package” was only about 5 per cent of this amount. But Obama has announced that he intends on Tuesday to close the barn door by proposing a bipartisan Senate Budget Commission to recommend how to limit future deficits – now that Congress is unwilling to give away any more money to Wall Street.

Republican approval would set the stage for Wednesday’s State of the Union message promising to press for “fiscal responsibility,” as if a lower deficit will help recovery. I suspect that Republicans will have little interest in joining. They see the aim as being to co-opt their criticism of Democratic spending plans. But in view of the rising and well-subsidized efforts of Harold Ford and his fellow Corporate Democrats, the actual “bipartisan” aim seems to be to provide political cover for cutting spending on labor and on social services. Obama already has sent up trial balloons about needing to address the Social Security and Medicare deficits, as if they should not be financed out of the general budget by taxpayers including the higher brackets (presently exempted from FICA paycheck withholding).

Traditionally, running deficits is supposed to help pull economies out of recession. But today, spending money on public services is deemed “bad,” because it may be “inflationary” – that is, threatening to raise wages. Talk of cutting deficits thus is class-war talk – on behalf of the FIRE sector.

The economy needs deficit spending to avoid unemployment and poverty, to increase social spending to deal with the present economic shrinkage, and to maintain their capital infrastructure. The federal government also needs to increase revenue sharing with states forced to slash their budgets in response to falling tax revenue and rising unemployment insurance.

But the deficits that the Bush-Obama administration have run are nothing like the familiar old Keynesian-style deficits to help the economy recover. Running up public debt to pay Wall Street in the hope that much of this credit will be lent out to inflate asset prices is deemed good. This belief will form the context for Wednesday’s State of the Union speech. So we are brought back to the idea of economic recovery and just what is to be recovered.

Financial lobbyists are hoping to get the government to fill the gap in domestic demand below full-employment levels by providing bank credit. When governments spend money to help increase economic activity, this does not help the banks sell more interest bearing debt. Wall Street’s golden age occurred under Bill Clinton, whose budget surplus was more than offset by an explosion of commercial bank lending.

The pro-financial mass media reiterate that deficits are inflationary and bankrupt economies. The reality is that Keynesian-style deficits raise wage levels relative to the price of property (the cost of obtaining housing, and of buying stocks and bonds to yield a retirement income). The aim of running a “Wall Street deficit” is just the reverse: It is to re-inflate property prices relative to wages.

A generation of financial “ideological engineering” has told people to welcome asset-price inflation (the Bubble Economy). People became accustomed to imagine that they were getting richer when the price of their homes rose. The problem is that real estate is worth what banks will lend – and mortgage loans are a form of debt, which needs to be repaid.

Michael Hudson is a former Wall Street economist. A Distinguished Research Professor at University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC), he is the author of many books, including Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (new ed., Pluto Press, 2002) and Trade, Development and Foreign Debt: A History of Theories of Polarization v. Convergence in the World Economy. He can be reached via his website, mh@michael-hudson.com

Martin Armstrong is once again making waves - February 4, 2009

February 4, 2009

Martin Armstrong’s Latest… from behind bars.

Martin Armstrong is once again making waves and becoming a topic of conversation from behind bars. There is much written about his circumstance and his past research. If you are not familiar with his work then it will be worth your time to at least become familiar with his wave theory. Here is a link to his basic Economic Confidence Model The Business Cycle And the Future . Here's a link to the article describing why he is in jail for contempt of court: The New York Times, and here's the article describing his additional 5 year term: The Wall Street Journal. I am NOT defending him, nor do I know or will I speculate on his activities that put him behind bars, I am mearly providing links to the information so that you can decide for yourself.

Here is a link to his article in .pdf form that he typed while in prison last year. In it he rants and raves a little but he provides some very valuable insights into wave theory, he is way ahead of many others in his understanding, I believe. Is it actionable? Not in the short term, but in the long term I believe his understanding is way better than most. This is a long read, but makes a good skim: It’s Just Time. The article below is a good summary of his pertinent thoughts but does not go very deeply into his wave theory.

Most people would consider him to be a little on the "flaky" side. I however do not in any way place him in the "tinfoil" category. He is a creative and outside the box thinker - that does not mean that he is not correct. And, in fact, he has been much more correct than most of the people who ordinary citizens would label "professional." Now, his timing may not be perfect and he may be a lousy trader and record keeper, but his insights into wave theory should not be ignored. Neither should his insights into the fundamentals of debt or the mechanics of the markets. This is a far better and more accurate article than 95% of the B.S. that comes across my screen.

Nate

Martin Armstrong: The Coming Great Depression

Armstrong Economics

The Coming Great Depression

Why Government Is Powerless

It is frustrating to read so many comparisons of our current situation with 1929 while watching policy be set-in-motion to create spending on infrastructure. Everyone has their hand out looking for a bailout like a bunch of street burns pleading for money so they can get drunk or stay drunk. Almost nothing of what I have read is close to being accurate. The scary part is depressions are inevitably caused by politicians who may be paving the road with good intentions, but are relying upon analysis so biased, we do not stand a chance.

The stock market by no means predicts the economy. A stock market crash does not cause a Depression. The Crash of 1903 was properly titled – “The Rich Man's Panic." What has always distinguished a recession from a Depression is the stock market drop may signal a recession, but the collapse in debt signals a Depression. This Depression was set in motion by (1) excessive leverage by the banks once more, but (2) the lifting of usury laws back in 1980 to fight inflation that opened the door to the highest consumer interest rates in thousands of years and shifted spending that created jobs into the banks as interest on things like credit cards. As a percent of GDP, household debt doubled since 1980 making the banks rich and now the clear and present danger to our economic survival. A greater proportion of spending by the consumer that use to go to savings and creating jobs, goes to interest and that has undermined the ability to avoid a major economic melt-down.

The crisis in banking has distinguished depression from recession. The very term "Black Friday" comes from the Panic of 1869 when the mob was dragging bankers out of their offices and hanging them in New York. They had to send in troops to stop the riot. A banking collapse destroys the capital formation of a nation and that is what creates the Depression. The stock market is not the problem despite the fact it is visible and measurable and may decline 40%, 60% or even 89% like in 1929-32. But the stock market decline is normally measured in months (30-37) whereas the economic decline is measured in years (23-26). Beware of schizophrenic analysis that is often mutually contradictory or often antagonistic in part or in quality for far too often people think they have to offer a reason for every daily movement.

Our fate will not be determined by the stock market performance. Neither can we stimulate the economy by increasing spending on infrastructure any more than buying your wife a mink coat, will improve the grades of your child in school. We are facing a Depression that will last 23-26 years. The response of government is going to seal our fate because they cannot learn from the past and will make the same mistakes that every politician has made before them. Even if the Dow Industrials make new highs next week (impossible), the Depression is unstoppable with current models and tools.

Stocks & Consumers vs. Investment Banks
Let us set the record straight. The Stock Market is a mere reflection of the economy like looking at yourself in a mirror. It is not the economy and does not even provide a reliable forecasting tool of what is to come economically. We are headed into the debt tsunami that is of historical proportions unheard-of in history. There have been the big debt crisis incidents that have hobbled nations, toppled kings, and set in motion economic dark ages. It is so critical to understand the difference between the economy and the stock market, for unless you comprehend this basic and root distinction between the two, survival may be impossible.


To the left I have provided the Economic Confidence Model for the immediate decline. You will notice I did not call this the "stock market model" nor a model for gold, oil, or commodities. I used the word "economic" with distinct and clear purpose. I have stressed it does not forecast the fate, of a particular market or even a particular economy. It is the global economic cycle some may call even a business cycle. Please note that what does line-up and peaks precisely with this model often even to the specific day that was calculated decades advance is the area of primary focus. Yet the US stock market reached a high precisely with this model and then rallied to a new high price 8.6 months later. In Japan, the NIKKEI 225 peaked precisely on February 26th, 2007. This is not a very good omen. But there was something profound that turned down with the February 27th, 2007 target - the S&P Case-Shiller index of housing prices in 20 cities. February 2007 was the peak for this cycle in the debt markets - not the US stock market. [edit by Nate - this was also the date that New Century Financial, a sub-prime lender, failed. I wrote in my own newsletter on that day that it marked the beginning of the end of the credit bubble].

The stock market always bottoms in advance of the economic low. In fact, we will see new highs in the now even in the middle of a Great Depression. At least the 1929 cycle was more of a bubble top in stocks than what we have in place currently in the US stock market. We still had the bubble top in the NASDAQ back in 2000, but this illustrates the point. There was a major explosive speculative boom. The bubble burst in 2000 and there was a moderate investment recession into 2002, but there was no appreciable economic decline that was set in motion because of that crash. Currently, we have a major high in 2007, but it was not a bubble top because it was not the focus of speculation. The real concentration of capital that created the bubble top, took place in the debt markets. This is the origin of the economic depression - not stocks and not the displacement of farmers because of a 7 year drought created by the Dust Bowl that invoked the response of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935. Keep in mind the stock market bottomed in the mid summer of 1932 when unemployment was not excessive from a historical perspective. The 25% level of unemployment came after the major 1932 stock market low that was followed by both the banking crisis after the election of FDR and before his fateful inauguration. The Banking Crisis came about because of rumors that Roosevelt was going to confiscate gold. Herbert Hoover published his memoirs showing letters written to Roosevelt pleading with him to make a statement that the rumors were false. He did not.

It’s the Debt Level Stupid
In 1907, the excessive debt was in the stock market. Call Money Rates (the level of interest paid to support broker loans) reached 125%. Even 1929 never came close to such levels. This also illustrates that the capital markets do not have enough money to invest equally on all levels in all segments of a domestic economy or in particular nations. To create the boom-bust, it requires the concentration of capital. A bubble top is formed when the majority of those seeking to employ money to make money are focused in a particular market or even country. The 1907 Crash was a bubble top because capital invested on a highly concentrated basis in railroad stocks. The bubble top in Japan back in 1989 was caused by a concentration of both domestic and international capital that had made Japan the number one market in the World. It is this concentration of capital that creates the boom and bust cycle. If money was evenly disbursed like the socialistic & communistic philosophies argue, we would be back to the dark ages where there was no concentration of capital and no economy beyond the walls of the castle so to speak. That is why communism failed.

It is the overall level of debt that has reached a bubble top in almost every possible area. For example, in 1980, household debt was about 50% of GDP. Going into the February 2007 high, it reached about 100% of GDP. We must also realize that something profound took place back in 1980. Americans would on the first blush seem to be living it up, buying everything they can on credit and have piles of tangible assets to show for it. That is like looking at the statistics for carrots and arguing that they are lethal because every person who has ever eaten a carrot is dead or in the process of a gradual slow death. This absurd example illustrates the bias that can produce the schizophrenic analysis.

There were, once upon a time, usury laws that generally held any interest rate greater than 10% was illegal. The Federal Reserve under Paul Volker believed that interest rates needed to be raised to insane levels to stop the runaway inflation, which was the first stone that hit the water sending the shock waves that we are having to pay for today. Once the usury laws were altered so the Fed could fight inflation, it set in motion the doubling of household debt, not to mention the national debt. At 8%, the principle is doubled through interest in less than 10 years. The national debt exploded from $1 to about $10 trillion in 25 years and household debt has doubled. Some states now consider usury to be 26%. Historically, these are the interest rates paid by the very worst of all debtors - the bankrupts. In fact, in China, the worst creditors historically paid at best 10%. What we have done is the lifting of usury to fight inflation back in 1980, has resulted in usury now being so high, a larger portion of income of the common worker is spent on interest, not buying goods & services that even create jobs. This is one primary reason why jobs have been leaving as well. The consumer needs the lowest possible price and labor wants the highest wages, and to stay competitive, producers leave taking manufacturing jobs as well as service jobs. The extraordinary rise in interest rates that are historical highs since at least pre-Roman times, could not have been possible but for the lifting of usury laws back in 1980 to fight inflation. This amounted to setting a fire to try to stop a brush fire that failed. Consumers pay the highest rates in thousands of years that feed the banks at the expense of economic growth. Even the National Debt rose from $2. 1 to $8.5 trillion between 1 986 and 2006 with $6. 1 trillion being interest. We are funding the nation on a credit card and destroying the economy simultaneously.

This has been enhanced by the tremendous leverage and false position that were created in the derivative markets causing the banks to just implode. Indeed, this is the origin of the economic Depression we are facing. The $700 billion bailout might have worked if Paulson did what he said he would - buy the debt and take it out of the banks. Had the debt been segregated into a pool and managed independently by a hedge fund manager not an investment banker, we could have mitigated the problem. But that is now too late.

The credit implosion is taking place on a wholesale basis around the world. The more the economy declines in housing prices, the greater the defaults, the greater the foreclosures, and the lower the economy will move. We are now in a downward spiral that cannot be fixed by indirect schemes. As I said, you cannot get your kid's test scores up by purchasing a mink coat for your wife. Everyone will have their hand out begging for infrastructure money. But the theory of just spending money that will somehow make things better, it is like handing Mexico a trillion dollars and arguing that they will buy US goods that will somehow reverse the economy.

The leveraging of debt by the Investment Banks in particular has undermined the global economy. Where household debt has doubled since 1980, the professional financial service sector has seen a rise from 21% of GDP in 1980 to 116% by February 2007. Now consider the debt that they created with the mortgages is already down by 50% and falling, the bailouts will keep coming. To help correct the problem, the commercial banks will tighten credit to make their exposure less, and in fact, their solvency ratios will require it anyway. This we can expect to see not just in business, but housing and car loans that will contract the economy as well.

The Great Depression is not the perfect model for today. It was a complete capital contraction. The stock market basis the now Dow Jones Industrials fell 89% between September 3rd, 1929 and July 1932. The contraction in debt was quite massive. Then too, the leverage in banks collapsed that reduces the velocity of money and therefore the money supply. The banks were the first real widespread failures with 608 in 1930. Between February and August 1931, the commercial banks began to bleed profusely as bank deposits fell almost $3 billion or about 9% of all deposits. As 1932 began, the number of bank failures reached 1,860. The massive amount of bank failures in the thousands took place with the rumor of Roosevelt's intention to confiscate gold. Although he denied that was his policy the night of the elections, he remained silent refusing to discuss the issue until he was sworn in. on March 6, 1933 just 2 days after taking office, Roosevelt called a bank "holiday" closing the banks from which at least another 2,500 never reopened.

All of these events are contrasted by the collapse in national debts in Europe. Other than Herbert Hoover’s memoirs, I have yet to read any analysis of the Great Depression attribute anything internationally other than the infamous US Smoot-Hawley Act setting in motion the age of protectionism in June 1930. It was the financial war between European nations attacking each other's bond markets openly shorting them that led to all of Europe defaulting on their debt. Even Britain went into a moratorium suspending debt payments. This is what put the pressure on capital flows sending waves of capital to the United States that to sane degree was kind of like the capital flow to Japan into 1989. This put tremendous pressure upon the dollar driving it to new record highs that were misread by the politicians who did not understand capital flow. They responded with Smoot-Hawley misreading the entire set of facts. (see Greatest Bull Market In History) (Herbert Hoover's memoirs).

It is true that today we have Keynesian and Monetarist theories to manage the crisis. Sad to say, neither one will now work. Bernanke has responded in force dropping the federal funds rate from 5.25% to .25%. He has also opened the Fed Window and thrown out more than $1 trillion in 13 months. However, as admirable as this may be, he has no tool that will do the job. Milton Friedman was correct! The Great Depression was not caused by the decline in the stock market. The event was set in motion by the credit and banking crisis that resulted in a one-third contraction in the money supply.

Interest rates will do nothing. The flight to quality always takes place so what happens is a two-fold punch. (1) Interest rates collapse because capital seeks preservation not yield and will accept during such times virtually a zero rate of return, and (2) the flight to quality takes more available cash from the private sector because government debt truly does compete with the private sector. We are seeing this even now. Federal debt becomes the place to go so we see higher yields in both state am municipal bonds because they are not quality and could default like any bank. This contracts the money supply. Opening the window and just throwing buckets of money into the system will never have any impact to reverse the trend.

Furthermore, we are now in a Floating-Exchange Rate system that has made the global economy far more complex than it was in 1929. We all know that China is one of the biggest holders of US government debt. With the contagion spreading to Russia, South America, and China aside from Europe, we see a steeper decline in the China stock market than we do in the United States because that is where capital had concentrated domestically. If China needs money to stimulate its own economy when exports appear to be collapsing by about 50%, then we can see that the Keynesian model is worthless. If the Fed tries to pump money into the system through buying bonds from the private sector, those bonds may be held by aliens who take the money back to their own economies. The Fed cannot be sure it is even capable of stimulating the purely domestic economy. Lower interest rates to virtually zero like Japan did during the 19905, then if capital finds a better place to invest, it can leave for a higher rate of interest as capital did from Japan to the United states, which is why their domestic economy was never stimulated by the' lower interest rates.

Leverage during the Great Depression was not even remotely close to what we have to face today. The credit-default swaps are alone worth about $60 trillion. This was a stupid product for it has so tangled the world there may be no way out. This product created the false illusion that you did not have to worry about the quality of the loan because it was insured. We have no way of covering this level of implosion. Add the unfunded entitlements and then the state and local debts who cannot print money to cover their shortfall s, and we are looking at a contraction of debt that is simply beyond all contemplation.

So What Now?
So now that we see it is not Wall Street, again, but the banks, perhaps we can separate the facts from the fantasy. We can now see that there are two separate and distinct forecasts to be made - (1) economy and (2) stock market. Economic Depressions have a duration unfortunately of generally 23 years with an outside potential of 26 years. The 1873 Panic led to a economic depression of really 23 years into 1896. There were bouts with high volatility and injection of major waves of inflation following the major silver discoveries. It was the age of the Silver Democrats who tried to create inflation by over-valuing silver relative to gold. This created a wave of European-American arbitrage where silver flowed into the US exchanging it for gold, which then flowed back to Europe. By 1896, the US Treasury was broke.

The Panic of 1873 marked the collapse of J. Cook & Co, the huge investment bank that was the 19th Century version of Goldman Sachs. They went bust because of excessive leverage in railroad stocks. It matters not what the instrument may be, it is always the leverage, which set the tone for a economic depression that lasted into 1896 where JP Morgan became famous for leading a bailout of the us Treasury organizing a loan of gold bullion. The stock market rallied and made new highs with plenty of panics between 1873 and 1896. The point is, The Panic of 1893 was quite a horrible one. The point is, the stock market is not a reflection of the economy. It often trades up in anticipation of better times, and trades down on those same perceptions of bad times. In both cases, new highs or lows unfold even contrary to economic trends.

We will see new highs in the now long before we see the final low in the economy. The ideal lows on a timing basis for the stock market will be as soon as April 2009 or by June of 2009. The more pronounced lows would be due on a timing basis between December 2009 and April 2010. The most extreme target would seem to be August 2010. The shorter the resolution to the stock market low, the sooner we will start to see much higher volatility.

The low for the Dow would be indicated by reaching the 3,500-4,000 area. A 2008 closing below 12,000 in the cash now Jones Industrials will signal that the bear market is underway into at least 2009 if not 2010. A year-end closing for 2008 below the 9,700-9,800 level, will signal higher volatility as well. The real critical level for the closing of 2008 will be the 7,200 area generally. A year-end closing beneath this general level will signal that we could see the sharp decline to test the extremes support at 3,600-4,000 by as early as April 19th, 2009 going into May /June 2009. If we were to drop so quickly into those targets, this would be most likely the major low with a significant rally into at least April 16th, 2010.

The less volatile outcome would be a prolonged decline into the December 2009 target to about April 16th, 2010. A low at that late date would tend to project out for a high as early as June 2011 or into late 2012. Nevertheless, volatility appears to be very high. Those who were at the 1985 Economic conference in Princeton, may want to review those video tapes. The volatility we were looking at 20-30 years into the future is now. As 3 of the 5 major investment bankers failed, Merrill, Lehman and Bear, the liquidity has evaporated so the swings are going to be much more dramatic.

The major support is 3,600 on the now Industrials. During '09, the support area appears to be 6,600, 5,000, and 4,000-3,600. Clearly, resistance is shaping up at 9,700-9,800. It would take a monthly close back above the 12,400 level to signal new highs are likely. If we saw a complete collapse into a low by April 2009 or June 2009 reaching the 4,000 general area, this would be the major low with most likely a hyper-inflationary spiral developing thereafter. In that case, the now Jones Industrials could be back at even new highs as early as mid 2011 or going into late 2012.

Gold has decoupled from oil as it should and has been rising on an ounce-to-barrel ratio. Here, the pivot area for 2009 seems to be the $730-$760 area with the key support being still at the $525-$540 zone. The major high intraday was on March 17th, 2008. A weekly closing below $800 warns of consolidation. Only a monthly closing below the $535 area would signal a major high is in place. The more critical support appears to be at about $680 - $705. A weekly closing beneath this area will also warn of a potential consolidation. A major high is possible as early as 2010-2011 with the potential for an exponential rally into 2015 if there is any kind of a low going into 2011.45. The key to watch will be crude Oil. The collapse of Investment Banks has removed the speculation that exaggerated the trend. A year-end close below $40 for 2008 would signal a major high and serious economic decline ahead.

There Are No Tools Left! The Emperor Has No Clothes
It is hard to explain to someone who believe he has power, that he really has nothing of any significance. This becomes the story of the Emperor Has No Clothes. No one will tell him, and if you do, it may be off-with-your-head. This is akin to the man behind the curtain in the Wizard of OZ trying to keep up the whole illusion. After all, why do we vote for people unless we believe that will somehow change our lives?

Interest Rates
When an economy is rising and the stock market is exploding, interest rates always rise because the demand for money is rising because people believe that they can make a profit. Government pretend to be raising interest rates to stop inflation, but they do not create a trend contrary to the free markets. What happened in 1980 was merely that the government over-shoots the differential between expectations and the rate of interest. If you believe the stock market will double, you will pay 20% interest. A rising interest rate does not create a bear market. Only when the rate of interest exceeds expectations of potential profit offering almost a fixed secured return, will capital leave the speculative market and run to the bond market.

In a bear market, interest rates always decline because of the flight to quality. When there is a risk of a .banking crisis as well, then the flight to quality shows that capital is willing to accept virtually zero in return for the privilege to park itself is a secure manner to preserve the future.

In both cases, the government may accelerate the trend, but by no means can they create the trend or alter the trend. Lowering interest rates to zero right now will not reverse the economic decline. People will look out the window and until they feel confident again, they will not come out from behind the castle walls. Japan lowered interest rates to virtually zero for nearly a decade. All it did was fuel the carry trade whereby yen was borrowed at 0.1 % and invested in dollars at 5-8%. There was little opportunity to invest domestically in Japan and the stock market languished in a broad consolidation with flurries the upside every-now-and-again.

Monetary Theory
The Fed has already put into the system about $1 trillion in 13 months. The real problem is they are buying back US government debt injecting cash into the system. But if those bonds are sold to the Fed by foreign holders, there can be no injection of cash into the domestic economy. This amounts to the monetization of our debt in any event. Clearly, buying bonds from the market is not a guaranteed increase in domestic money supply especially when the velocity of money is itself collapsing. Borrowing heavily all these years and depending on foreign investors to buy that debt, altered the course of economics. Of course there has always been the foreign investor, but there has not been the floating exchange rate system. The rise and fall of the dollar itself can now either attract foreign capital with an advance or repel capital with its decline. Like we needed another new variable.

Infrastructure Spending
There really is nothing left in the tool bag that can help even to mitigate the coming Economic Depression. The unemployment rate at the end of 1930 was only about 8.9% - similar to the 1975 recession. Things were very slow back then. Even housing was not moving and people took whatever offers came their way. It was the Dust Bowl that began in 1934 that sent the unemployment rising after the 1932 low in the stock market. About 40% of the work force was agrarian. Hence, Congress could not pass a law to make it rain. The real devastation was that this presented a huge portion of the work force that had to be retrained into skilled labor. It was the Great Depression that finally by force of necessity, created an industrial work force that may have taken another 200 years to unfold by gradual transformation.

The WPA was formed in 1935, 3 years after the low in the stock market (1932). It had a slow and marginal success. At best, if we attribute all improvement to this one program, very unlikely, unemployment was only reduced by about 20%.

1935 20.3%

1936 16.9%

1937 14.3%

1938 19.0%

1939 17.2%

1940 14.6%

Even if we attribute everything to the WPA, all the way into 1940, the most the unemployment declines was by 30%. However, at the end of World War II, we see an Unemployment rate of 1.9% by 1945. Any ideas that we can spend trillions on infrastructure and make it all better, forget it.

Turning to infrastructure in the middle of a debt crisis makes no sense. The idea of just spending money will somehow stimulate the economy, will not work. This is like trying to fight in the desert of Iraq using the same tactics as in Vietnam. There has to be sane connection to what we are doing. Just because FDR instituted the WPA when we had a huge displacement issue in the work force, almost 6 years after the crash began, makes no sense at all for our current problems. As I said, this is like buying your wife a mink coat to somehow influence your kid to get their grades up. The connection is tenuous at best and nonexistent in all reality.

Summary
Unless we attack the debt structure directly, there is no point in counting upon any government to help mitigate the problem and more-likely-than-not, our very future may be recast in so many ways, the level of frustration will rise, and that leads to war because war distracts the people from hanging their own politicians. The oldest trick in the book is to blame the guy next-door down. Unless we are honestly prepared to truly 1) reorganize the structure of government, 2) reorganize the entire debt structure both private and public, 3) regulate leverage, 4) restore usury laws that will free up personal income, and 5) look at just eliminating the federal income tax in combination with 6) establishing a new national heathcare system that will restructure all pension plans public and private, there is not much hope for the future from government. Our definition of money (M1) does not include bonds so we can fool ourselves by issuing $10 trillion in bonds is different than printing the cash. It is still money. Taxes are needed in a gold standard where money cannot be created. Stop competing with the states, control the budget as a percent of GDP, increase the money supply to that degree, and stop the taxing when money is created by leverage and velocity anyway. This will restore jobs and inject huge confidence as in 1964 when the payroll tax was cut permanently. One-offs never work. People save the rebates for a rainy day. We need real honest reform since the states will go broke and seek handouts as well. So, it is time to get real. It is time we restructure the entire system including the banks which always cause the problem. We don't need excessive regulation of things that did not create the problem when the real culprits always escape.

You may send comments directly to Martin Armstrong at ArmstrongEconomics@GMail.com.

What Really Happened with the AIG Swaps? It's Not What You Think

By now most people who follow Goldman Sachs in the news know that it received $13 billion from the Federal Reserve to liquidate its portfolio of derivatives with AIG. Because the Fed was willing to pay Goldman par value on these derivatives, even though the market valued them at about 48 cents on the dollar, Goldman walked away with no loss whatever from the AIG collapse. This has been described as a great gift for Goldman and all the other banks who dealt with AIG and who were treated the same way. Many others have described this as a colossal rip-off of the taxpayers.

How did this come about? We know a lot more this week about these transactions because of a report that has been issued by Neil Barofsky, the Special Inspector General for the bank bailout programs. The press has described this report as particularly damning of the NY Federal Reserve which negotiated these deals with the banks, and which was led at the time by Timothy Geithner, the current Treasury Secretary. These press reports, however, have mischaracterized what happened and what went wrong. The NY Fed acted properly and entirely as one would expect under the circumstances when they negotiated these contract abrogations. To see what really went wrong, follow along on the details below.

The AIG Transactions

First, a little bit of background on what got AIG into trouble. The insurance giant had a subsidiary in London called AIG Financial Products (AIGFP). This company developed a business that offered customers financial protection on a derivatives contract known as a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). These derivatives packaged together various debt instruments, such as loans, bonds, mortgage-backed securities, even other CDOs, into a single security. When you bought the security, you received a regularly scheduled set of cash flows generated by these debt instruments as interest payments were made. You paid an up-front premium for these cash flows, which usually took place over a three to five year period during the life of the security.

It is interesting to note that the buyer of the security, and for that matter the seller/creator of the security, had no legal interest in the debt instruments. The bonds or loans could be any debt of this nature where public information was known about the interest rate, and whether or not a default had occurred by the debtor. There could be dozens, or even hundreds of different debt instruments bundled into one security.

These CDOs carried a public rating from Moody’s or S&P or Fitch, any of the three big ratings agencies. Also, you could get a daily price on the CDOs from a third party pricing agent located in London. If the price was 100, the security traded at its par value, meaning all payments were highly likely to take place over the life of the security as required by the contract. If the price was 48, on the other hand, it meant the market believed the security was seriously impaired due to defaults occurring on some of the debt instruments in the security.

Big banks loved to create CDOs up until the market crashed in 2007. CDOs were very lucrative. Banks had loan books that gave them a natural portfolio of debt as a start in creating a CDO, but there also was the booming housing market bubble that allowed for the creation of mortgage-backed securities. A huge amount of CDOs were created based on these mortgage instruments. Banks also realized that when they created and sold these securities to earn the profitable premiums involved, they were still on the hook in case any of the debt instruments in a security experienced a default. They wanted to get rid of this risk as much as possible, and pay away a little bit of their lucrative premiums for the privilege.

Here is where AIGFP comes in. AIGFP invented a derivative that acted like an insurance contract. Banks would pay AIGFP a premium, and AIGFP would promise to indemnify the banks in the event they experienced any losses on a specified CDO. The company used a derivative called a Credit Default Swap (CDS, unfortunately easy to confuse with a CDO) to structure this insurance product.

AIGFP was not regulated by any financial oversight agency. It didn’t even have to keep reserves on potential payouts on these CDSs, and even if it did, it has stated that the reserve amount would have been very small because it did not anticipate significant losses on the underlying debt instruments it was insuring. What AIGFP had going for it, and what the banks liked, was that it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of AIG, which carried a Aaa rating in its own name for everything it did. By virtue of this rating, AIG was viewed as one of the highest quality companies in the financial world – almost as safe and sound as a government.

The most common type of CDOs brought to AIGFP were called multi-sector: they had a little bit of everything mixed into them – loans, bonds, mortgage-backed securities on sub-prime mortgages as well as higher-quality instruments like prime mortgages. As long as none of these different types of instruments experienced unusual rates of default, the entire CDO would be traded on the market at a price close to par, and the ratings agencies would have no cause to downgrade the security.

What began to cause AIGFP trouble with its portfolio of credit default swaps backing up about $72 billion of multi-sector CDOs, was not that there were so many defaults on the CDOS that AIGFP had to make large payments under the swaps. The real problem was a series of collateral obligations AIGFP undertook every time it entered into a CDS, and the collateral conditions varied from one swap to the next.

There were three possible triggers for a collateral payment from AIGFP to the banks that bought insurance in the form of CDSs. The first occurred if the underlying CDOs being insured in the swap experienced a drop in price on the market – say from par value to 48 cents. The second occurred if the ratings given by Moody’s or some other agency on the CDOs were downgraded. The third occurred if AIG’s Aaa rating itself was downgraded.

You can now begin to see the sequence of liquidity disasters that befell AIGFP, and soon engulfed its parent AIG, starting in the summer of 2007 and extending until September 16, 2008 when AIG was near death. First, as the market realized that the US sub-prime mortgage business was experiencing very high and unexpected defaults, everyone looked at multi-sector CDOs that carried a significant percentage of these debt instruments in the security. These CDOs began to trade at lower and lower levels in the market as no one was sure just how impaired they would become.

Second, the ratings agencies began to downgrade dozens of CDOs because of the heightened default risk, and the lower prices in the market.

Third, the ratings agencies realized by 2008 that AIG stood behind the CDO market as insurer for the tune of $72 billion. At first, the long term rating of AIG was lowered, and this began a series of collateral calls from AIGFP’s swap customers. Then, by the summer of 2008, the ratings agencies were looking at downgrading AIG’s short term ratings, and doing so by several notches, which brought into question whether AIG could meet all of its obligations under these swaps. This accelerated the demands for collateral on AIG, which was experiencing a very unexpected triple whammy of collateral calls. By September, 2008, AIG had already coughed up an astounding $30 billion in collateral, and was really only half way through what ultimately it would need to satisfy contractual demands for collateral from the market. It simply ran out of resources to raise any more liquidity, and it faced inevitable default under its swap contracts, which would have led to bankruptcy.

This was the situation facing the Fed by the second week of September, 2008.

The Fed Steps In

The Fed already had its hands full in the summer and fall of 2008. First, Bear Stearns collapsed and was thrown into the arms of JP Morgan Chase, but only after the Fed agreed to take over the Bear Stearns real estate portfolio worth $30 billion in dodgy real estate assets. The quasi-government giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had to be taken over by the government, then Countrywide Financial collapsed and also was pushed into a forced sale to a bank.

There was so much criticism directed at the government for the way in which these rescues were being done, and the amount of taxpayer money spent in the process, that when it came time to deal with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Treasury and the Fed threw this firm to the wolves on September 15, 2008. It received no help from the government and was thrown into the bankruptcy courts. This precipitated a global market meltdown.

The trigger for this meltdown occurred at the oldest mutual fund in the US, American Reserve Fund, which took a writedown of $785 million on Lehman Bros. bonds it held in its money market fund. This was announced on the afternoon of September 15, and by the close of business that day massive amounts of withdrawals were taking place at American Reserve since no money market fund had ever experienced such a loss (money market funds were supposed to be as safe as checking accounts).

When the market opened the next morning, mutual funds everywhere couldn’t cope with the withdrawals. The commercial paper market ground to a halt, as did the Eurodollar market for short term loans in London. Stock markets around the globe tanked. The global financial system was nearly paralyzed.

The US government stepped in and guaranteed the safety of all money market funds. It allowed Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two surviving old-line investment banks, to become commercial banks and enjoy the benefits of Fed liquidity. The Fed had been working since the previous week on the dire liquidity situation at AIG, and it had asked JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs to form a bank syndicate to provide AIG with a massive $75 billion loan to solve its liquidity problem.

JP Morgan Chase came up with a package that charged AIG an onerous 11.3% on the $75 billion loan – a full $9 billion a year in interest alone. The banks would take an 80% ownership interest in AIG’s assets. This loan package was also intended to stop the ratings agencies from yet again lowering AIG’s ratings, which would have cost the company yet another round of collateral calls from the market.

There was one big problem, though. When the banks looked at AIGFP’s portfolio of swaps, and the potential collateral demands that could still occur, they realized that AIG, if it could sell all of its assets at decent market prices, still wouldn’t be able to meet the liquidity demands. In other words, the way the market was developing, AIG was headed straight towards default and the bankruptcy courts. Making this situation even worse was the global market collapse occurring at the same time as the result of the Lehman bankruptcy. The banks told the Fed that the loan package had collapsed. The banks effectively threw the AIG problem on to the laps of the regulators, none of whom by the way had any legal responsibility, regulatory oversight, or historical familiarity with AIG. It was an insurance company that had somehow become bigger and more important than even the biggest banks.

In deciding what to do, the Fed had about 24 hours from September 15 to 16 to analyze with the Treasury the AIG situation. They discovered that AIG would default on $103 billion in loans from state and local governments, $50 billion in bank loans and derivatives, $20 billion in commercial paper, and $40 billion in insurance covering 401k retirement packages across the US. The problems ranged from the horrendous to the horrific. The municipal bond market stood to be devastated by state and municipal loan losses. The Lehman bankruptcy involved $8 billion in commercial paper losses, which led to the Reserve Primary Fund disaster, but AIG’s commercial paper losses were much bigger at $20 billion. The 401k losses would affect tens of millions of Americans. AIG’s loan losses spread to banks all around the world.

The Fed and Treasury, standing in the middle of a global financial collapse the day after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, felt they had no choice but to save AIG, a much bigger player with far greater reach and implications for economic and financial disaster. The Treasury authorized an $85 billion line of credit at the Federal Reserve NY for the purpose of lending to AIG the amounts needed to post collateral behind its swaps at AIGFP. The Fed had no plan in place on how to do this, so it simply lifted the term sheet conditions from the JP Morgan failed loan package, and used those terms to lend to AIG.

From September 16 through October, the Fed lent $61 billion to AIG, over half of which found its way into the market as collateral to support its swaps. At the same time, AIG was instructed to begin reducing its swap book. This required AIG to turn to all the big banks with which it had a swap portfolio, and ask to close out, or abrogate the swap contracts. The banks would consider doing this, but would not want to be then left with the CDO risk that caused it to enter into the swaps in the first place. There was some talk of AIG therefore taking over the CDOs as well, which had sunk substantially in value because of the default risk, but it was very difficult to agree with each bank on what these CDOs were worth. In fact, the banks weren’t willing to sell these CDOs at any discount whatsoever, despite what the market said they were worth, so AIG turned to the Fed for help, and authorized the Fed to negotiate on their behalf.

Here is where we come to the gist of the Barofsky report and the criticisms of the Fed. But let us recap two critical facts up to this point. As of September 15, AIG was certainly heading for bankruptcy, within a manner of days. The banks stood to lose billions on their swaps with AIG, because they would be under-collateralized if the CDOs fell further in value, and because they could not easily all at once get replacement CDS coverage for their CDOs.

Second, shortly after September 16, the banks began receiving collateral from AIG, courtesy of the Fed via the $85 billion loan authorization. For the next two months, the banks were made whole as necessary whenever their CDOs fell in value. The banks could look at their portfolio with AIGFP and consider it safe and secure because of the collateral, and as important, because of the guaranty of more collateral to come as necessary, courtesy of the federal government.

The Fed Tries Its Hand at Negotiating

In early November the Fed assigned a team of managers to begin negotiating for the abrogation of the CDSs. They chose the eight largest bank counterparties to talk to, including Goldman Sachs, BOA, JP Morgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, UBS, and top of the list was Societe Generale in Paris. The plan was to ask the banks to tear up the CDS contracts through a legal abrogation agreement. It was common for banks to do this in the derivatives market from time to time, though never before on a large scale. The banks always required the customer to pay them for any potential real market losses they may incur in abrogating the contract, plus interest and a bit of a fee for all the trouble. Abrogations have never been cheap, especially if the customer was desperate to get out of a deal.

What would the banks want? Collectively, they held CDOs worth a face value of $62.1 billion, and these were the underlying CDOs behind the swaps bought from AIGFP. The banks wanted to give these over to the Fed and get $62.1 billion back, because otherwise the banks would be stuck with CDOs that were unhedged for further default problems.

The market price for this collective group of CDOs was in early November $29.6 billion, which tells you just how badly the market had trashed these instruments. But the banks held cash collateral of $35.0 billion to protect against just this contingency, and if you add the two numbers up, you come to a bit over the $62.1 billion in face value. In other words, the banks were sitting pretty. They were 100% covered for the existing market losses on these CDOs, and the market pricing was beginning to stabilize.

Remember that all this collateral came from the Fed on behalf of the now moribund AIG. The banks wanted to do a simple deal. They would give the Fed all the CDOs in exchange for $29.6 billion in cash – their current market value. They would keep all the existing cash collateral, so they would be perfectly whole. They would then abrogate the CDSs and have no further claim on AIGFP, as if the whole mess never occurred. The Fed, meaning the taxpayers, would be out $62.1 billion in cash to clean this mess up.

In preparing talking points for the negotiations, the Fed reminded each bank that it would be appropriate to give back some of the collateral to the Fed rather than keep it all. The Fed, by stepping in a month earlier, had saved the banks from billions of losses had AIG gone into bankruptcy, and these losses might have included a systemic crisis in which a few other banks went under and couldn’t pay their obligations as well. “”Be nice to us, given all that we have done for you,” was the Fed motto.

The Fed then tied the hands of their negotiators in several ways. First, the Fed would not threaten to throw AIG into bankruptcy if they didn’t get a “haircut” on the $35 billion in collateral. This would be unethical because the Fed had no plan to put AIG into bankruptcy and everybody knew it. Second, the Fed negotiators would have to do the same haircut deal with everybody. If Goldman Sachs agreed to return 30% of the collateral, JP Morgan Chase would have to agree to the same thing. Third, the banks were told up front that their participation in the negotiations was entirely “voluntary”; nobody was going to be forced to do anything or accept any haircut.

You should not be surprised that seven of the eight banks refused to take any haircut on the collateral and would therefore return none of it. They argued the cash was theirs, not the Fed’s, and they owned it by the sanctity of a legal contract that the Fed was proposing to violate. Second, AIGFP was not in default and there was no bankruptcy, and there wouldn’t be any, so giving back collateral when there was no legal requirement would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty that the banks had to their shareholders. Unstated in all this was the fact that the Fed wasn’t threatening any consequences if the banks refused to give back any of the collateral.

The kicker that destroyed any possibility of the Fed getting some of the collateral back occurred with the French bank. They told the Fed that it was not simply a fiduciary responsibility they had to follow in keeping cash that was rightfully theirs – it was decidedly against French law to give back the collateral because there was no bankruptcy. The French regulators confirmed this in no uncertain terms to the Fed, with the implication that if the Fed pushed on this point relationships with the French government would be damaged. Remember that all the banks had to agree to the same deal, so each bank had a veto power over any deal, and the French bank had the ultimate veto – it was illegal for them to give back the collateral.

The negotiating team reported all this back to Timothy Geithner, and recommended that the Fed settle all the swap abrogations by allowing the banks to keep all the collateral and thereby effectively receive par value on contracts that in the market were worth less than half that. Geithner agreed and the deal was done. The Fed then promptly kept all these details secret, including the names of the banks involved, and even went to court to maintain this secrecy under the financial equivalent of a “state secret” argument. They recently lost this argument on appeal to a higher court, and the Barofsky report severely berated the Fed for this because no terrible consequences have occurred now that the details are known.

What Went Wrong Here?

The Barofsky report lays a pretty heavy blanket of criticism on the Fed for not just the secrecy of their actions, but the actions themselves. The Fed didn’t have to treat everyone all the same. It could have accepted different levels of haircuts. It didn’t have to put so much faith in the sanctity of contracts when AIG was in virtual suspended animation – bankruptcy in all but name.

These criticisms do not show an understanding of how the Fed works. Like any large American organization, it pays considerable attention to the law. Timothy Geithner had a high powered, high-priced General Counsel sitting as his right side all the way. Geithner was told clearly that as long as AIG was not in bankruptcy, the Fed might damage its reputation by violating the terms of perfectly sound legal contracts and insisting on repayment of collateral when it was not legally required. He was also told the Fed had no ethical right to threaten bankruptcy when the threat could not be backed up later in court with proof it was real. He was probably told – though there is no proof of this in the report – that giving any bank preferential treatment on haircuts exposed the Fed later to lawsuits of unfair treatment.

Timothy Geithner is like most American executives – he is a technocrat. He respects technical advice, especially of the legal kind, and he abides by it. Past presidents of the NY Fed might be different – Gerald Corrigan comes to mind during the Drexel Burnham bankruptcy. He would bang some heads together to get an outcome that satisfied the political pressure on the Fed, even if it meant overriding legal advice. Gerald Corrigan, by the way, now works for Goldman Sachs. He might have in this situation taken Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase aside and said, “I want you guys to get your consortium of banks to agree on a haircut – something like 30% would be nice – and I want all of you to come back and voluntarily request that the CDS collateral provisions be waived in favor of paying back to the Fed some amount of the collateral. I don’t care how you do this, and it is not going to be the Fed asking for it – it is going to be voluntarily offered to us.” The banks would not need to be told that there was a steel hand underneath the Fed’s velvet glove.

Maybe Timothy Geithner would have done this, technocrat though he is, if there were enough political pressure on him to save the taxpayers billions of dollars, but there wasn’t. No one in the Bush administration – certainly not Henry Paulson at Treasury – was demanding fairness for the taxpayers. There was public disgust over the whole bailout process, but this disgust got bottled up in a Congress paid for by the financial industry. Barofsky might have mentioned that lack of political pressure, and the consequent insensitivity to taxpayer needs that the Fed and the Treasury displayed, but he didn’t, maybe because his current paymaster, the Obama administration, isn’t showing any such sensitivity either.

Which brings us to the crux of the problem, only hinted at in the Barofsky report. The real problem for the taxpayers didn’t occur when the NY Fed failed to negotiate the return of some of the collateral in November, 2008. The problem occurred on September 16, when the Fed and the Treasury were suddenly faced with a collapsing AIG. Had there been any forethought and planning for such an event, the reaction could have been very different and far less panicky.

The first response should have been: ”Financial markets worldwide are frozen, and they are going to stay frozen for a long time no matter what we do with AIG." In hindsight, this is exactly what happened. The commercial paper market has taken nearly a year to recover a fraction of its previous activity, and this was only after the Fed had to guarantee transactions. Credit spreads took nine months to begin coming down to normal levels. Banks are lending to each other only because governments around the world now guarantee their bank activity, but banks are still not lending to corporations, small businesses, or individuals. The housing market in the US exists entirely on the generosity of Federally-managed firms like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHA. In other words, the disaster that the Fed faced on September 16 rolled on despite the rescue of AIG.

If AIG had been allowed to fail, the market would have learned a serious lesson about dealing with companies that act like banks but really have no controls or regulatory oversight like banks. The pain would have been greatest at the banks themselves. Some banks like Citigroup and Bank of America would have been even more crippled than they are now, but their current status as zombie banks would not be any different. The damage done to 401ks could have been mitigated by additional federal government guaranties, but even here the cost while enormous would have been less than what was spent paying off AIGFP’s credit default swaps at par.

Suppose you say that it is impossible to expect government bureaucrats to react on September 16 in any different manner. You can argue that any normal person would have panicked too, and that tough-nosed regulators like Gerald Corrigan don’t come around all that often – in fact these days they are all working for Goldman Sachs. Fine. Where, then, was the prudential planning for this catastrophe. All it would have taken is someone in advance of the crisis – a clever lawyer for example – inserting one clause in the agreements with banks before any collateral was posted with them. It would have said “The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reserves the right at any time to demand immediate repayment of any or all amounts of collateral posted with Bank X, with no compensation required to be paid to Bank X in any form by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Bank X hereby waives all rights to petition for a legal stay of said repayment.” If the banks didn’t like this clause, they wouldn’t get their collateral. They could go ahead and sue the government for breach of contract, but in the meantime they would be experiencing real pain with their CDO portfolio and the pressure would be on them to settle. Once the collateral was out the door, the Fed lost all leverage with the banks, and this is why the November negotiations were a foregone conclusion and a waste of time.

Finally, what is fundamentally missing at the Fed and the Treasury, and certainly now with two successive administrations and almost all 535 public servants in Congress, is the sense that the big financial institutions which have created this monstrous mess are dispensible. The problems that have arisen due to their avarice and misjudgments are only going to be solved over time, and are best solved in bankruptcy courts or through FDIC closure processes, not by making these institutions wards of the state until 10 or so years later they are nursed back to health. The public can and has been protected through deposit insurance, but the collapse of lending and credit in general has not been mitigated one whit by anything done so far to rescue these institutions. Let them die a merciful, quick death if death is their fate anyway. We will all of us individually benefit from such mercy as well.

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By Numerian 2009-11-19 11:01

URL: http://agonist.org/numerian/20091118/what_really_happened_with_the_aig_swaps_its_not_what_you_think

CEO Beating 13: I am amazed that NONE OF YOU HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED YET

Rep. Alan Grayson: Even on Wall Street, Losers Must Lose

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kriOmxO-yvc